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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Differences in religion, language, culture, race and oppression are often the 
simplified explanation adopted in Dominican grade school textbooks to explain why 
today the island of Hispaniola stands politically divided.1 In other words, because 
Dominicans speak Spanish, practice Roman Catholicism and are a racially mixed society, 
a match with Haiti (a black society that speaks French-Creole) is incompatible. However, 
this explanation based on multiple differences is unsatisfactory and even detrimental to 
understanding the path of unification and separation that these two societies embarked on 
from 1822 to 1844. Specifically, the problem lies in the terminology and the questionable 
conclusions that such an explanation produces. Scholars such as Emilio Rodríguez 
Demorizi choose to present Haiti as an ambitious imperialist force that occupied its 
neighbor to the East.2 Indeed, Dominicans ultimately deemed the annexation unfavorable 
in 1844. However, official documentation attests that Dominicans freely chose to unite 
with Haiti.3  
Although reputable scholars agree that the term “occupation” is flawed, most 
Dominicans still brand it as so. The current historical narrative is replete with passionate 
glorification of the independence movement of 1844 and defamation of Haitians. The 
                                                 
1 Joaquín Balaguer, La Isla al Revés (Santo Domingo: Librería Dominicana, S.A., 1984), 
161. 
2 Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, Invasiones: Haitianas de 1801, 1805, y 1822 (Cuidad 
Trujillo, Editora del Caribe, C. por A., 1955), 22. 
3 Jean Price-Mars, La República de Haití y la República Dominicana, 4th ed. (Santo 
Domingo: Sociedad Dominicana de Bibliófilos, Inc., 2000), 113. 
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passion works to conceal key shortcomings with the independence movement of 1844. 
These flaws would produce a weak nationalist identity that was unable to ensure the 
sovereignty of the republic in 1860s against Spanish expansionist projects. The blinding 
nationalist sentiment of today impairs adequate scholarly evaluation of the twenty-two 
year period of Haitian annexation. Since the 1970s, Dominican scholarly attention to this 
period is far too abbreviated leaving the anti-Haitian legacy of Dominican dictator Rafael 
L. Trujillo to heavily dominate the narrative. Their combined fifty-year tenure, Trujillo 
and Joaquín Balaguer dedicated much effort to slander Haitians as imperialists who 
simply degraded Dominican society during those twenty-two years of annexation.  
The resounding influence they exerted over the historiography leaves the 
impression that the narrative is complete. Thus, explains the absence of contemporary 
scholarship that explores this chapter in Caribbean history. Congruently, many of the 
sources used in this thesis are dated. My thesis attempts to highlight and breakdown 
silences within the narrative. This is thesis the first work in English to explore the twenty-
two years of Haitian-Dominican unification and the only detailed work strictly dedicated 
to it in the last four decades. The relevance of this independence struggle must not be 
underestimated for it will allow us to consider issues of colonial rejection and 
abandonment that defined Dominican identity then but that are rarely considered today. It 
will help us determine the key factors that stimulated Haitians, and later Dominicans, to 
seek unification and which factors contributed to the ensuing their separation.  
The main argument of this work is that Santo Domingo was annexed to Haiti 
because the Eastern municipalities considered Haiti (and President Boyer) as better 
positioned to incentivize the Dominican economy and ensure the military protection of 
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the island as a whole. And finally the union between the two communities unraveled 
because Dominican rejected Port-au-Prince’s economic policy and state-sponsored ethnic 
biases. Port-au-Prince was unable to check Dominican separatists’ engagements due to 
fighting within Haiti’s military and political spheres. In order to support the claims 
presented in this introduction, this work is divided into six chapters. As a bridge to the 
second chapter, this introduction will provide a short overview of the previous political 
divisions within the island, the Haitian invasions of 1802 and 1805, and the separatist 
movements of 1809 and 1821. 
The second chapter considers the causes and effects of the pronouncements by 
various Dominican provinces that requested their annexation to Haiti, what Victor 
Garrido calls the Boyerian Movement.4 In addition, I shall consider why the capital city 
of Santo Domingo first abstained from producing a pronouncement favoring Haiti and 
instead opted for petition for a protectorate with Gran Colombia with the declaration of 
1821. Why was this declaration destined to promptly expire? The third chapter will then 
explore the reasons behind Spain’s lukewarm and delayed reaction to the loss of its first 
colony in the New World to Haiti. What was happening in Spain from 1808 to 1830 that 
permitted it to be unmoved by the loss of Santo Domingo? This chapter also evaluates the 
persuasiveness of Spanish and Haitian claims over Santo Domingo during the territorial 
dispute of 1830. The fourth chapter reflects on President Boyer’s executive decisions and 
character. It takes particular note of Boyer’s accentuated emphasis on foreign and 
economic policy, the problems with state-sponsored racism and the lack of social 
services. The fifth chapter will explore the coup d’état against Boyer and how the 
                                                 
4 Víctor Garrido, Espigas Históricas (Santo Domingo: Impresora Arte y Cine, C. por A., 
1971), 72. 
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manipulation of French diplomats propelled separatists groups in Santo Domingo (such 
as the Trinitarios and the Afrancesados) to seek the separation of the Spanish Part from 
Port-au-Prince in 1844. I shall also consider why this separation was not successful in 
igniting a nationalist identity among Dominicans. Before I reflect on the matter at hand, 
we must situate the key factors that preceded President Boyer’s triumphant march across 
Santo Domingo in February 1822.  
Consult any world atlas, turn its pages to find the Caribbean and you will find at 
its center the island of Hispaniola, the second largest in the West Indies. Currently it is 
the most populous island in the hemisphere and the holder of more than half of the 
population of all the Antilles.5 Today the island is home to two countries: Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic. Christopher Columbus founded the first permanent European 
settlement in the Western Hemisphere in 14976 with the establishment of Santo 
Domingo.7 In the first 30 years of the Spanish colonization of the Americas, Santo 
Domingo quickly lost its primacy and became one of Spain’s many expendable pawns in 
the European struggle to colonize the region. Maybe because of the great size of the 
empire or because of increased importance of newly discovered territory in the mainland, 
the Spanish Crown increasingly neglected to strengthen military fortification and to 
bolster the economic security of Santo Domingo leaving it susceptible to squatters on its 
                                                 
5 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United 
Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, 
http://esa.un.org/unpp. 
6 Scholars do not agree on whether Santo Domingo was founded on 1497, 1498, or 1502.  
The date 1497 is found in Frank Moya Pons, Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo 
(Santiago: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1977), 57. 
 5 
western extremities.8 Santo Domingo was officially divided for the first time in 1697 with 
the Treaty of Ryswick that ceded the Western third of the island to France.9 This bilateral 
agreement produced the French colony of Saint-Domingue, the main world exporter of 
sugar in the 1700s and which would later become Haiti.10 
With Saint-Domingue’s growth in economic preeminence through the 1700s, its 
Spanish neighbor to the East was able to tap into its neighbor’s commercial pull. “By 
1789 the French colony of Saint-Domingue was supplying two thirds of the imports and 
exports of France, a volume of foreign trade greater than that of the newly freed thirteen 
American colonies combined.”11 However, with the Haitian Revolution in the 1790s and 
the wars in Europe, global political and economic conditions were redefined. As a way to 
recuperate from France the lost Spanish territory east of the Rhine River in Europe, with 
the Peace of Basel in 1795 Spain agreed to cede its claim to the Eastern two thirds of the 
Hispaniola.12 France hoped that with Santo Domingo at hand it could produce more 
effective military assaults against the now rebellious colony of Saint-Domingue. The 
accords stipulated that all the inhabitants of the Eastern side could abandon the ceded 
colony within a year if they so desired. Those who had deemed Santo Domingo was a 
refuge from the storm raging in Saint-Domingue understood that the transfer of power 
from Spanish to the French would guarantee an extension of the violence into the Eastern 
Part of the island. Consequently, a massive population exodus ensued within Spanish 
                                                 
8 Juan Francisco Martínez Almanzar, Manual de Historia Crítica Dominicana, 6th ed. 
(Santo Domingo: Centro de Adiestramiento e Investigación Social, 1996), 143. 
9 Price-Mars, 63. 
10 Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: the Story of the Haitian Revolution 
(Cambridge: the Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 2004), 17-19. 
11 Selden Rodman, Quisqueya: A History of the Dominican Republic (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1964), 31. 
12 Martínez, 191. 
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Santo Domingo. In short, the global revolutionary drive was undoubtedly unfavorable to 
Santo Domingo.13 
In order to secure the advances made towards Haitian independence and 
undermine French ambitions on the island, on January 26, 1801, Toussaint Louverture 
invaded Santo Domingo with the acclamation and praise from many there.14 Louveture’s 
assurance to respect civilian life and economic tranquility was not enough to placate the 
thousands of white conservative Dominicans that chose exile in Cuba, Venezuela and 
Puerto Rico losing much of their possessions.15 From January to June of 1802, the French 
general Charles Leclerc and his forces succeeded in driving Louvature out of Santo 
Domingo and brought about his demise by inciting division among the Haitian generals.16 
Jean-Jacques Dessalines would adopt Louvature’s aspirations with regards to Santo 
Domingo and proclaim the island as “indivisible” within the Haitian Constitution of 
1804.17 Thus once he proclaimed Haitian independence, Dessalines launched the first 
Haitian invasion of Santo Domingo in 1805 after French authorities ordered the capture, 
enslavement and sale of any Haitian near the border.18 British traveler, James Franklin, 
noted in 1828 that “the city of Santo Domingo had rendered ineffectual all the efforts of 
the blacks to sow dissention among the people.19 In other words, Haitians considered the 
neighboring colony as a sanctuary for dissenters of abolition. French administration there 
                                                 
13 Moya Pons, Historia Colonial, 345. 
14 Rodman, Quisqueya, 38. 
15 Carlos Esteban Deive, Las Emigraciones Dominicanas a Cuba (1795-1808) (Santo 
Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1989), 97. 
16 Dubois, Avengers, 267. 
17 Price-Mars, 53. 
18 Martínez, 203. 
19 James Franklin, The Present State of Hayti (Santo Domingo): With remarks on its 
Agriculture, Commerce, Law, Religion, Finances, and Population etc. (Westport: Negro 
University Press, 1970), 184. 
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had to be dispelled. However, upon seeing French ships heading to Port-au-Prince, 
Dessalines deemed the invasion as a costly diversion and decided to return west leaving 
massive destruction, civilian casualties and further white flight.20  
With the leadership of cattleman Juan Sánchez Ramírez, in 1809 the criollo 
community in the Eastern colony embarked in an armed project to restore Spanish 
colonial authority there.21 The war to restore Spanish colonial rule sought to show 
Dominican support for Spanish King Ferdinand VII, who Napoleon Bonaparte had 
displaced from the throne in 1808.22 Sánchez Ramírez’s decision to return Santo 
Domingo to Spanish control was sparked after the French government had outlawed the 
sale of cattle and beef with Haiti, the unquestionable economic base of the Cibao and its 
neighboring regions.23 Sánchez Ramírez and his fellow colonialists were able to defeat 
the French at Palo Hincado and to drown the local nascent independent movement. Spain 
was unable to compensate its returning colony for its loyalty because it was facing 
rebellion all over the empire and rending it incapable of effectively administering itself. 
Thus, from 1809 to 1821, the era referred to as la España Boba, Madrid allowed Santo 
Domingo to descend into further economic and military decadence.24 The invasions from 
the west, the military menace of France, and the failures of Spanish colonial 
                                                 
20 Martínez, 205. 
21 Ibid., 206. 
22 Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1975 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clerendon Press, 1982), 81. 
23 Carlos Esteban Deive, “La Abolición de la Esclavitud y la Independencia de Santo 
Domingo,” in Rebeldes y Marginados: Ensayos históricos, (Santo Domingo: Banco 
Central de la República Dominicana, 2002), 43. 
24 Martínez, 210. 
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administration left Santo Domingo with a population count of only 63,000; a fifty percent 
loss from the 125, 000 residents it contained in 1797.25 
The Haitian Revolution and the war of restoration forced Dominicans to seriously 
consider questions of sovereignty, emancipation, and identity. What ensued divided 
Dominicans who affiliated with either the Conservative or Liberal party. Starting in 
November 1821, the division was made clear when the provinces of Montecristi and later 
Dajabón declared their secession from the Spanish colony and asked to be annexed to 
Haiti.26 In December 21, in the city of Santo Domingo, José Núñez de Cáceres declared 
the colony separate from Spain and lobbied for the protectorate of Gran Colombia.27 As 
we shall see in the next chapter, Núñez de Cáceres’s failed to consult with the other 
provinces before producing the declaration of separation. His imperious actions alienated 
the rest of the colony, resulting in polarization that ultimately allowed Boyer to absorb 
his neighbor to the East.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Balaguer, 103. 
26 Price-Mars, 116. 
27 Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, Santo Domingo y la Gran Colombia: Bolívar y Núñez de 
Cáceres (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, C. por A., 1971), 13. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ISLAND-WIDE FUSION: DIVERGENCE OF THE MUNICIPALITIES FROM THE 
MANDATE OF THE CITY OF SANTO DOMINGO 
 
 
  The union of Santo Domingo in 1822 to its neighbor to the West leaves historians 
today perplexed for it occurred relatively rapidly, with minimal violence and with no 
bloodshed. Considering the aggressive campaigns of 1801 and 1805 from the West side 
against Santo Domingo and the others destabilizing events that the Haitian Revolution 
caused there, it is difficult to conceive that within the same generation Dominicans would 
be poised to enter the Haitian state. Because of this perplexing turn of events, confusion 
exists as to why and how the project for island-wide union materialized in 1822. Scholars 
have assessed the situation differently branding the union as an occupation or 
domination. Both these terms are inadequate and misleading. They explicitly disregard 
fundamental evidence that attest to another scenario.  
Important events and documentation generated in the months prior to Boyer’s 
march across Santo Domingo confirm that Haitian excursion there in 1822 was legal. 
With the restoration of Spanish colonial control, Santo Domingo experienced a drastic 
economic restructuring and subsequently a weakening its political command. Dominicans 
understood their precarious situation but disagreed on the right measure to address it. The 
disagreement left the colony’s capital city of Santo Domingo at odds with the 
municipalities it administered, which had developed a separate profitable market with the 
support of Haitian consumers. Contrasting economic foresight between the capital and 
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municipalities produced a deep political division within Santo Domingo that contrasted to 
that of a unifying Haiti in the early 1820s. The increasing internal and external isolation 
of the city of Santo Domingo provided Boyer with the conditions to absorb the colony 
entirely.  
During the period of La España Boba, Dominicans would attempt to reverse the 
economic depression that followed the Haitian Revolution. French management of Santo 
Domingo had cost the island a severe population drain. Emigrants abandoned property 
and left vast lands unattended producing capital flight and thus an overall decline in 
consumption. Cattle raising and breeding was the main source of income for Dominicans 
from the late 1700s to the early 1800s. The Dominican market was dominated by 
conservative cattlemen with vast estates, what is locally understood as the hatero or 
ganadería industry (livestock industry).28 Their influence was such that they did not need 
to be near the capital city to be a considerable force. This explains why Sánchez Ramírez, 
a cattle rancher from the small and distant town of Cotuí, would be the main architect of 
the War of Colonial Restoration in 1809 and subsequently the governor of said colony 
once it was restored to Spain control officially in 1814.29  
However, by the period of La España Boba the conservative ranchers’ power was 
irreversibly decimated with the fall of animal husbandry. The wars in Europe and in Haiti 
had diverted commerce away from Santo Domingo. Investment there was risky for it was 
the battleground for French and Haitian altercations. The pronounced emigration from 
Santo Domingo left ranchers without a substantial local consumer market. The 
evacuation of forty thousand residents from Santo Domingo by the start of the 1800s had 
                                                 
28 Martínez, 211. 
29 Ibid., 206. 
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paralyzed the nascent economic activity of the 1700s.30 In other words, white flight 
shrunk the circulation of capital and local consumption became too costly. Consequently, 
fresh beef, a perishable product with no exportable quality, was no longer a viable base 
for economic growth.  
Soon Dominican entrepreneurs gravitated to tobacco and timber. Timber 
(specifically mahogany) and the cultivation of tobacco involved small agriculture and not 
large slave estates.31 This was ideal for Santo Domingo since it was under populated. 
Sugar, cotton and coffee (the main exports of Haiti) would be unsustainable there for 
these required a large and cheap labor force, which was unavailable in the East. Timber 
would be planted in the Southwest and tobacco in the fertile central valley of the Cibao. 
The decision not to compete with the Haitian market allowed Dominican cultivators to 
develop a partnership with Haitian planters rather than competition. This allowed for 
substantial capital and labor osmosis across the border. Both mahogany and tobacco were 
exportable goods. The commercial interaction that ensued helped the Cibao and the 
Southwest to reinsert foreign capital the colony.  
In contrast, the city of Santo Domingo could not revive the commercial vitality 
the its port once had. The city remained economically starved and lacked international 
commercial ambition. During the twelve years of the La España Boba (1809-1821), Spain 
would invest a total of fifty thousand pesos on Santo Domingo; such financial 
contribution arrived in one sum on July 1817.32 Given that Spain was unable to exert the 
role of provider, the governor of Santo Domingo hopelessly begged Cuba and Puerto 
                                                 
30 Rodman, 39. 
31 Roberto Cassa, Historia Social y Económica de la República Dominicana, Vol. 1 
(Santo Domingo: Editora Alfa & Omega, 2006), 305. 
32 Moya Pons, Historia Colonial, 409.  
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Rico for financial assistance. The profit emanating from the Cibao and the Southwest 
only covered half of the administrative expenditures and ultimately produced an incurring 
balance.33 The deficit complicated military and personal salary payments throughout the 
colony. As a result, municipal officials grew increasingly infuriated with the laxity that 
Spain and the city of Santo Domingo upheld. Unlike, the cities of Santiago, Puerto Plata, 
and San Juan de la Maguana, which had greater international foresight, the city of Santo 
Domingo stood by Spain for twelve unproductive years. Such a manifestation of loyalty 
was undoubtedly unfavorable for the capital city in the long run. The lack of money 
forced the city to focus on agricultural production for domestic consumption. Governor 
Carlos Urrutia transformed adjacent abandoned state lands into conucos or small plots of 
land used for the cultivation of local staple foods and fruits.34 Agriculture was force-fed 
to these city dwellers that were not accustomed to hard labor and favored white-collar 
jobs. In other words, the Cibao and the Southwest were export driven agricultural centers 
of production that had to sustain a poor and lethargic colonial capital. The contrast 
between the city of Santo Domingo and the provinces it administered is one that 
Dominican historians today rarely highlight but that is essential to understanding why 
these municipalities would later challenge the capital’s separatist campaign.  
The city of Santo Domingo further contrasted with its sisters for its constant 
defensive attitude towards Haiti. The capitaleños (residents of the city of Santo 
Domingo) supposed that since its establishment, Haiti sought to absorb the remaining two 
thirds of the island. This assumption stirred distrust among capitaleños with their 
neighbors to the West. Their attitude was founded on Haiti’s constitutional directive. 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 410. 
34 Ibid., 408. 
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Articles one and eighteen in the preliminary declaration of the Haitian Constitution of 
1805 stated that the island formally known as Santo Domingo would henceforth be 
identified as the “empire of Hayti” with all its adjacent islands (the island of Gonâve, 
Beata, Saona, and Tortuga island) as components of such empire.35 This island-wide 
assertion is known today as the “indivisibility” clause. In other words, Haitians officials 
agreed with Louverture’s declaration that the island of Haiti was “one and indivisible.”36 
This clause predicted the invasion of 1805 and the article’s continuation throughout the 
early 1800s made the possibility of Haitian expansion an unyielding project. Dessalines 
was unable to successfully retain its neighbor in 1805 because of French and English 
interference. Furthermore, the violent and popular assassination of Dessalines in October 
1806 placed an indefinite hold on any efforts to absorb Santo Domingo for no single 
executive was able to command all of Haiti.37  
The dispute polarized and fragmented Haiti into the separate states of the North 
and South. According to traveler James Franklin, Christophe (who was next in command 
to Dessalines) would control the territories in the North while Alexandre Pétion 
(commander-in-chief of Port-au-Prince) would command over the lands in the South.38 A 
divided state could not absorb another community. Christophe and Pétion were concerned 
with their mutual threats. They were able to unite forces on one particular objective, 
however, Dominicans had to be stimulated and assisted in expelling the French. Price-
Mars explains that above the goal of annexation, stood the need to free the island of all 
                                                 
35 Price-Mars, 53. 
36 Ibid., 187. 
37 Frank Moya Pons, La Dominación Haitiana: 1822-1844 (Santiago: Universidad 
Católica Madre y Maestra, 1972), 16. 
38 Franklin, 202. 
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French control.39 Although few Dominican scholars give Christophe and Pétion credit for 
helping in the war for colonial restoration, without Price-Mars’ clarification it is hard to 
believe that Dominicans would have sufficient battle equipment and drive to present a 
substantial challenge against France (even with the support from Puerto Rico and Great 
Britain). The polarization in Haiti prolonged itself until Boyer was able to alienate 
Christophe from his military base in 1820 and unite the two territories.40 
Capitaleños defensive attitude against Haiti was evident in 1820 under the 
governorship of Kindelán. Don Sebastián Kindelán y Oregón, the colony’s Governor 
from 1818 to 1821, was greatly troubled by the colony’s inadequate defenses. On January 
31, 1821 Kindelán informed the Secretary of State and of the Office of Governance of 
Ultramar and in a separate letter the Secretary of State and the Universal Office for War 
in Madrid of the defenseless condition of the colony. 41 He assessed that the “barracks,42 
the guards corps, and the rest of the military edifications threatened to go to waste if the 
pitiful ruin that daily deteriorates them is not halted.”43 Kindelán’s urgent request for 
military equipment and improvement of the defenses was stimulated after Boyer sent a 
delegation across the border to campaign for an island-wide union. On December 5, 
1820, Don José Lazala, Military Commander of Las Matas de Farfán, informed Kindelán 
that Haitian Commander, Dezir Dalmasi, was bribing him and other military officers in 
San Juan de la Maguana and Azua. Lazala reported that Dalmasi promised “better 
employment and a thousand other things” if they would not stand in the way of Boyer’s 
                                                 
39 Price-Mars, 105. 
40 Franklin, 235. 
41 Garrido, 25. 
42 All translations in this thesis are the author’s. 
43 Ibid., 41. 
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armada upon their imminent descent onto the colony.44 This type of persuasive campaign 
directed at the opposition’s defenses sought to heighten anxiety and invoke egocentric 
ambition as a means to divide. This strategy of “divide and conquer” had effectively 
brought the demise of Louverture, Dessalines, and Christophe. Boyer understood its 
efficiency and he did not dally to use it against the weak armada to the East. He also sent 
his escort, Coronel Iznardi, to contribute to the propaganda. Iznardi announced that 
French ships docked in Martinique would soon overtake Santo Domingo. Particularly, he 
tried to convince Pablo Baéz (mayor of Azua) to join the annexationist cause by 
presenting him with the deceptive news that the neighboring towns of San Juan, Las 
Matas and Neyba had already yielded to Boyer’s command.45 
This propaganda sought to absorb the colony peacefully and circumvent a military 
expedition into the Eastern territory. Unlike Dessalines, Boyer did not resort to 
indiscriminate destruction. The campaign was based on rhetorical persuasion and 
deception rather than direct force. His desire for peace may have been sincere but Boyer 
may have also been trying to conserve his supply of military equipment. In short, the 
propaganda of Dalmasi and Izanardi was ineffective in delivering Santo Domingo in 
1820. All the state officials that were bribed immediately informed Kindelán of the 
menacing campaign. Kindelán was able to act fast and called for the arrest of any Haitian 
enticer of annexationist propaganda and requested a formal explanation from President 
Boyer himself relating to this disruption. Boyer responded by declaring that “never had 
they [Dalmasi and Iznardi] been given any such mission.”46 Renowned Haitian scholars 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 26. 
45 Ibid., 31. 
46 Ibid., 40. 
 16 
like Jean Price-Mars admit that Dalmassi and Iznardi were in fact following Boyer’s 
orders. However, the order of arrest against them was never carried out.  
Why did Dominican officials abstain from detaining Dalmasi or Iznardi when 
they were under their jurisdiction? Dalmasi was well known in San Juan for it was 
principal residence. There he worked as a dealer in the animal husbandry market.47 Local 
officials did not arrest Dalmasi because they did not deem him as threatening. For 
Dominicans residing near the border this attitude of familiarity extended to most 
Haitians. Hence, while capitaleños feared Haitian excursion into Dominican territory, 
Dominicans elsewhere were unconcerned. This increasingly familiarity with Haitians was 
the result of their mutual increasing economic trade and territorial proximity. With the 
unification of North and South, Haiti’s consumer market consisted of 661,000 people.48 
The depressed but ambitious export economy of the Cibao foresaw tremendous gains if it 
had greater access to the Haitian market. The Cibao and the Southwest understood that 
the local minuscule local market of approximately seventy thousand was not conducive to 
the economic recovery they sought to achieve with the export of tobacco and timber. 
Therefore, by 1821 the interior provinces had embarked on a considerable economic drift 
that positioned them at odds with its capital regency. 
Consequently, it would be the interior provinces that would champion Boyer’s 
unification efforts and discard the opposition emanating from the capital city. In 
November 15, 1821 the adjacent towns of Monte Cristo (what today is Montecristi) and 
Dajabón in the Northwestern most point of the Spanish side made an official request to 
join Haiti. The pronouncement of the first read: the people “have judged opportune to 
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hoist the Haitian flag and we [the local authority] have consented…we expect that Your 
Excellency will protect that city that hence forth is part of the Republic of Haiti.”49 This 
document that commanding officer, Diego Polanco, signed is the first out of a series of 
nine similar official pronouncements that summoned for Boyer’s military protection and 
agreed to their incorporation to the Republic. The pronouncement from Dajabón is 
similar in its language but includes three signatures and a request for ammunition in case 
that the municipality is “demanded to abandon the cause.”50 The weight of these 
documents is significant for it was military and governmental officials rather than 
subversive forces from the underground that produced them. Also, in the case of 
Dajabón, they expressed explicit willingness to engage in armed conflict against the 
capital or Spain if they demanded for a change in course. It is unclear if the 
pronouncements were produced in spontaneous and independent fashion or if Boyer 
specifically asked for them to be written before hand. Simply put, Dajabón and 
Montecristi were voicing their dissatisfaction with the Spanish tutelage and wanted out.  
The response of the city of Santo Domingo to the secession of Dajabón and 
Monte Cristo was in all measures alienating. With the help of military commander Pablo 
Ali, on November 30, 1821 the Judge Advocate and previous Lieutenant Governor, José 
Núñez de Cáceres arrested the newly appointed governor of Santo Domingo, Pascual 
Real, in order to secede the colony from Spain (by then Kindelán was reassigned to La 
Habana).51 Without making much effort to recall back Monte Cristo and Dajabón to its 
fold, Núñez de Cáceres declared the colony’s separation from Spain and bid for the 
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protectorate from Gran Colombia on December 1, 1821.52 The declaration that Núñez 
penned opened with “no more dependency, no more humiliation, no more subjugation to 
the whims and caprice of the cabinet of Madrid.”53 The declaration was in its simplest 
form a detailed explanation for why Dominicans had grown dissatisfied with their 
custody under Spain citing Spanish rejection and neglect, which was responsible for 
poverty and ignorance among its faithful subjects there. Núñez recognized that Spain was 
economically and militarily in decline and thus unqualified to support any colony. He 
indicated solidarity with the other Latin American independence movements and 
paraphrases the political philosophy of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. With his declaration he also changed the name of the colony to the 
independent state of Spanish Hayti. Besides this instance, the word “Hayti” does not 
reappear on the document. The author does not provide the reader with any reason as to 
why he considers Dominican fusion with Gran Colombia as more favorable than with 
Haiti. Considering that two municipalities had already defaulted in favor of Haiti, 
addressing this matter was essential. His lengthy explanation concerning the inefficiency 
of Spanish colonization was superfluous since most Dominicans already agreed on this 
matter. Did Núñez presume that by pronouncing a separation from Spain, the provinces 
would have abstained from submitting to Haiti? Did he consider that the return of 
Dajabón and Monte Cristo was a lost cause? Nevertheless, his declaration does little else 
to discourage other provinces from following the lead of Monte Cristo and Dajabón. By 
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sidestepping this critical matter Núñez made his project ineffective. Therefore, his 
declaration of 1821 was a document with minimal persuasive appeal. 
Unequivocally the declaration failed to ensure the unity it was trying to preserve. 
The civil and military command of the various provinces was unconvinced by Núñez’s 
declaration. Within days, the municipalities of Saint-Yague (Santiago), Puerto Plata, La 
Vega, San Juan, Neyba, Azua, Cotuí and San Francisco de Macorís54 replicated the 
annexationist pronouncement from Monte Cristo and Dajabón in favor of Boyer. Victor 
Garrido refers to this chain reaction as the Boyerian Movement.55 All of these 
municipalities were in the Cibao or the Southwest region, which were significantly 
economically engaged with Haiti at the time. The pronouncement from Santiago 
specifically denounces Núñez’s declaration and repudiates the fusion with Gran 
Colombia when he calls it “antisocial” and having an effect of “universal dissatisfaction.” 
The provisional Junta Central that produced it explained that the decision made in Santo 
Domingo only reflected the interest of a “few particulars, sacrificing [the interests of] 
thousands of respectable heads of families.”56 In other words, Núñez failed to consult 
with the various municipalities when he wrote the declaration and also when drafting the 
constitution of Spanish Hayti. The self-driven attitude of Santo Domingo was highly 
alienating to these localities that demanded to be heard. This need for self-determination 
and political participation is evident as each pronouncement specified the names of the 
delegates that would represent them in Port-au-Prince. Therefore, Núñez was acting in a 
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political vacuum that would quickly delegitimize the state apparatus he sought to 
construct. But why was the proposition to join Gran Colombia so unpopular among 
Dominicans? 
Dominicans understood that Núñez de Cáceres was dumping the colony at the 
doorstep of yet another distant state that was politically and economically unfit to address 
the ills of the colony. Bolívar’s call for Latin American political unity appears to have 
captivated Núñez de Cáceres. However, Gran Colombia was a young state whose deep 
internal divisions perturbed its continuation as a state. Bolívar struggled greatly to 
appease the opposing political and economic interests there. In addition, Gran 
Colombia’s navy was in its infancy and thus could not protect an island across the vast 
Caribbean Sea.57 Nonetheless, Núñez quickly sent a delegation headed by Antonio María 
Pineda to Caracas to reach an agreement that would effectively incorporate Spanish Hayti 
to Gran Colombia. In the only letter referring to such a mission, Simón Bolívar wrote to 
Francisco de Paula Santander on February 8, 1822, “I have received the pleasant news 
from Santo Domingo… we must not abandon those who proclaim us because it mocks 
the good faith of those who consider us strong and generous… that very island can bring 
us, in a given political negotiation some advantage.”58 Bolívar ended his note by 
presenting Santo Domingo only as an advantageous but disposable pawn in a possible 
political compromise. The attitude of Gran Colombia was as dismissive and objectifying 
as that which Spain had previously manifested for said colony on repeated occasions. No 
other official mention of Santo Domingo’s annexation appears in the Dominican 
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archives.59 The fact that Bolívar debriefed Santander on the annexation project belatedly 
shows minimal interest in Gran Colombia for Núñez’s project. Núñez’s plan appeared 
even more flawed for he decided to hoisted the flag of Gran Colombia without reaching 
any prior agreement with Bolívar. This may explain why the provinces were clearly 
against the option of a Colombian protectorate. In other words, the proclamation of 
December 1, 1821 had no domestic or international muscle to back it up. In agreement 
with Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, Núñez’s proclamation put to the test Bolívar’s project 
for Spanish American unity and promptly assessed it as false advertisement. 
The existence of Spanish Hayti was further jeopardized because Núñez failed to 
reach an agreement with Boyer. The sixth article of the Constitutive Act of 1821 dictated 
that another representative would be sent to formulate an accord with the Haitian 
president. This accord would promote cooperation between the western and Eastern Part 
of the island by establishing a commercial and defensive alliance.60 What factors made 
Núñez believe that Haiti may be interested in such an alliance? Why would Jean Pierre 
Boyer concede to the dealings of the capitaleños when he obviously was within grasp of 
executing the indivisibility clause of the Haitian constitution? This article shows that 
Núñez and his delegation were overestimating their bargaining situation. In short, it was a 
highly ambitious and obstinate campaign. Congruently, Victor Garrido deems Núñez as 
an impulsive leader lacking anticipation and unable to control the projects he 
undertook.61 He made his decision at an inopportune moment when Haiti was standing 
strong and united and Santo Domingo was weak and divided. Boyer also embarked on a 
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persuasive propaganda with the provinces to the East that Núñez never undertook. In 
other words, Núñez did not assemble the appropriate mechanism to halt Haiti’s 
annexationist project. The only factor favoring his entire plan was that Spain was in no 
condition to retain the colony he was trying to liberate. Therefore, Garrido identified 
Núñez de Cáceres as directly guilty of the twenty-two years of Haitian “occupation.”62 
However, such an accusation is too sweeping. With or without the proclamation of 
Spanish Hayti, Boyer would have marched triumphantly across Santo Domingo. Núñez’s 
actions just accelerated the fusion. But what validity has Garrido’s claims that Haiti 
occupied Santo Domingo? 
Boyer’s threatening letters and the large military force that escorted him into the 
Spanish side may be grounds to call the project of 1822 an occupation. The existence of 
Spanish Hayti extended until January 19, 1822 (lasting only seven weeks) when Núñez 
wrote the pronouncement of Santo Domingo and recognized Dominican obedience to 
Haitian laws.63 The pronouncement was written immediately after Boyer’s public 
statement encouraging Núñez and any other opponent to the island-wide unity to yield. 
The letter dated January 12, 1822, answered the first nine pronouncements when it 
confirmed that their protection was guaranteed and rejected the proposition of a defensive 
and economic partnership with Spanish Hayti. Boyer also announced, “I shall make the 
visit of the entire Eastern Part with imposing force, not as conquistador (God willing may 
that title never approach my thoughts) but rather as a pacifier and conciliator of all 
interests in harmony with the laws of the state…I hope to encounter on all corners 
nothing but brothers, friends and sons to hug. There are no obstacles capable of detaining 
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me.”64 The language here is both threatening and soothing. The tone here is similar to 
that of Dalmassi and Iznardi who used the threat of force and reiterated the reassuring 
protection of Port-au-Prince to compel municipalities in San Juan de la Maguana to join 
the cause for unification.  
Núñez wrote the pronouncement of Santo Domingo because he lacked the 
military capability to combat not just Boyer but also the defiant municipalities. The city 
of Santo Domingo could not afford the looming civil war that towns such as Dajabón 
forewarned. Just as this letter predicted, Boyer along with twelve thousand other men 
(divided in two columns originating from north and south) marched across the Eastern 
territory and reached Santo Domingo on February 9, 1822.65 If all of the municipalities of 
the Eastern Part66 had submitted to Boyer’s authority why did he consider it necessary to 
arrive with such imposing force? Leaders often orchestrate such display of military might 
in order to persuade a community that it is best to comply with the change in 
administration. Boyer’s heightened show of force provides grounds to denominate this 
encounter as an invasion. However, this is not the main evidence prominent Dominicans 
historians cite to sustain the label of “occupation.”  
The term of “occupation” is not fully justified. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi and 
Manuel Peña Battle deem it preposterous that a people who Dessalines had ravaged only 
seventeen years prior would solicit the protection of said wrongdoer in 1822.67 Indeed, 
the campaigns of 1801 and 1805 from the West involved invading forces. The latter was 
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extremely violent and produced massive population flight. However, even then there 
were residents of the Eastern Part that favored annexation to Haiti. As early as 1805, 
Santiago (the second largest city in the Spanish side) requested its incorporation to Haiti 
but the proposal was recalled after Dessalines demanded from the Santiagueros a tax of a 
hundred thousand pesos, which they were in no position to pay.68 Therefore, this idea of 
union with Haiti did not sprout suddenly in 1821 as Peña Battle and Rodríguez Demorizi 
attest. This option resurfaced with Boyer, a new and more persuasive leader then his 
predecessors. Nevertheless, recalling the invasions of 1801 and 1805 to validate the 
branding of Boyer’s entrance in 1822 as an “occupation” is an evident use of a slippery 
slope. These campaigns may have had parallel goals but the strategy to achieve it was 
dissimilar. Dessalines and Toussaint entered forcefully, without significant Dominican 
inducement and producing armed confrontation. None of these factors apply in the case 
of Boyer.  
Rodríguez Demorizi also supports the label of occupation by invalidating the 
pronouncements. “There is nothing more puerile then to attribute value to such banal and 
deceitful documents,” says Rodríguez Demorizi.69 He adds that these summons were 
produced by force and only reflected the voice of a “worse” and “isolated minority.” He 
presents no evidence that indicates Boyer forced Monte Cristo and the other 
municipalities to produce these convocations. Equally questionable is the claim that 
Boyer was attending to the whims of a few. Rodríguez Demorizi does not show how the 
pro-Hispanic or pro-Colombian parties outnumbered the pro-Haitian. The fact that most 
of the pronouncements were produced by a junta (Santiago) or by multiple signers 
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(politicians and military officials) confirms that they reflected the will of a diverse and 
representative community. The same cannot be said of Núñez de Cáceres’s declaration in 
1821, which no other town caucused to support. Even the Trinitarios (the political 
organization that founded the Dominican Republic in 1844) in their declaration of 
independence attests that most Dominicans welcomed with enthusiasm the entrance of 
Boyer in 1822.70 Evidently, the minority voice was in fact that of Núñez de Cáceres and 
the city of Santo Domingo, which attempted to forcefully have its way. Rodríguez 
Demorizi’s argument shows fundamental signs of bias. His partiality is reflective of the 
time under Dictator Rafael L. Trujillo who embarked on a ruthless thirty-year campaign 
to slander Haitians in general.  
In contrast to Peña Battle and Rodríguez Demorizi, most Dominican Historians 
today agree that the pronouncements are authentic and valid. Victor Garrido, Joaquín 
Balaguer, Frank Moya Pons, and Juan Francisco Martínez Almanzar are some of the 
numerous scholars that agree to the authenticity of the documents presented in Price-
Mars’s book. In particular, Juan Bosch clearly affirms that Haiti was not an “imperialist 
state.”71 Even so, all of them continue to call the twenty-two year period of Haitian and 
Dominican political unity an “occupation” and “domination.” The reason why the period 
merits either term is never explained. Therefore, the label is one that is taken for granted 
in Dominican historiography. The only scholar that provides an explicit explanation on 
the matter is Pedro Troncoso Sánchez. According to him the unification effort of 1822 
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was not the result of “a voluntary accession, nor an annexation, nor in general an 
incorporation in which existed sincere cooperation from the Spanish part…it was simply 
the realization of biological and psychological laws that the conquistador [Boyer] astutely 
reverted with the appearance of conscious and voluntary acts.”72 In other words, 
Troncoso agrees with Rodríguez Demorizi and Peña Battle that Boyer fabricated the 
pronouncements for purposes of legitimizing his expedition to the East. 
This argument, however, does not hold with the primary sources. In an 
anonymous poem from 1830, the author refers to the Colombian campaign as a bearer of 
“more desolation to this coveted land” and referring to Boyer’s arrival he paints a 
celebratory mood that contrasts heavily to that when Christophe entered in 1805.73 
“Radiant with joy, mixes the acclamations with happiness, saying: Live, long live in 
perpetual peace President Boyer who rescued us from such sorrow…giving the rightful 
thanks to God…for concluding this enterprise without one gunshot.” The contrast 
presented in the poem clearly favors the legitimacy of the Boyerian Movement. The fact 
that the poem was found in Cuba may indicate that a Dominican migrant subsequently 
dissatisfied with Boyer’s policies produced it, thus attributing the poem’s author more 
value since it was someone from across the political spectrum that wrote it. The absence 
of violence, the joy of the people, and the fact that it was the powerful white criollos and 
the mulattos of the Cibao and Southwest that sponsored the fusion shows that Boyer did 
not arrive uninvited. However, is the absence of unanimous agreement within Santo 
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Domingo in 1822 concerning the Boyerian Movement enough to validate the labeling of 
Haiti’s entrance an occupation?  
Certainly not. This twenty-two year period should simply be labeled as an 
“annexation” or “unification.” Occupations and invasions involve the unwarranted 
injection of a foreign entity within a given community. The municipalities’ 
pronouncements, the local popular support confirmed in the poem above and the absence 
of conflict confirms that Boyer’s entrance was solicited. Annexation, fusion and union 
are better terms for what occurred in 1822 because mutual agreement was evident 
between two majority parties. In accordance with Juan Bosch, the improper use of labels 
is the result of Dominican scholar subjugation to “a climate of passion that has prevailed 
in every referent” to this period.74 Contemporary volatile feelings with regards to Haiti 
have being blended with the antecedent attitudes of 1822 producing an accentuated 
distortion of the scenario being studied. Therefore, term “occupation” is the result of 
biased historians who refuse to believe that Santo Domingo would enter into union with a 
nation-state they considered as inefficient and too alien to themselves. 
The annexation of Santo Domingo to Haiti in 1822 was the result of President 
Boyer’s persuasive unification campaign among Dominicans, the empowerment of the 
Cibao and the Southwest regions and the increased political and economic isolation of 
Santo Domingo. The Cibao and the Southwest identified significant economic and 
defensive advantages with their incorporation to Port-au-Prince. The annexationist 
campaign of Núñez de Cáceres to Gran Colombia in 1821 lacked domestic popular 
support. Its alienating effect among the various Dominican provinces was not the single 
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factor that contributed to the success of Boyer’s unification campaign but it accelerated 
its realization. Unlike the invasions of 1801 and 1805, no sympathetic international force 
assisted the conservative elite of Santo Domingo in undermining Haitian ambition to 
administrate its eastern neighbor. The city of Santo Domingo was ultimately overruled 
domestically and unaided from without. The effect of Boyer’s march was intimidating to 
some but favored by most. Although both Núñez de Cáceres and the pro-Haitian 
community summoned foreign states to take on the Dominican political tutelage, today 
only the latter succeeded and is deemed an occupation. The use of the terms “occupation” 
and “invasion” is obviously the result of scholars who struggle to distance themselves 
from present biases. Giving this historical development more balanced analysis will allow 
us to better understand the evolution of Dominican identity and how political and 
economic standing shaped it.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
EXILES AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ATTEMPT TO REVIVE SPAIN’S 
INTEREST IN SANTO DOMINGO 
 
 
In just twelve years, Santo Domingo had morphed from a French to a Spanish 
colony and then to a Haitian territory. This sudden political change is just one of the 
many in the 1800s that Dominicans would experience because of its easily destabilized 
and shrunken political sphere. Nonetheless, the reasons behind the transformation of 
1822 did not simply reflect turbulence within the local administration in Santo Domingo. 
The marriage of the Eastern and the Western portions of Hispaniola was also the result of 
the prolonged indisposition of the Spanish monarchy. Liberal reform that sprouted from 
1809 to 1823 not only incapacitated the Spanish sovereign from effectively 
administrating its various colonial possessions but also Spain itself. The powerful liberal 
thought that enveloped Europe crossed the Atlantic to reach the West Indies.  
The successes of the rebel forces within Spain provided a reproducible blueprint 
for pro-Haitian forces within Santo Domingo to sever the tie with the mother country 
starting in 1821. Nonetheless, was there ever any effort to reclaim Santo Domingo once 
Spain achieved political stability? Yes, in 1829 a more cohesive Spain interceded and 
requested the return of its former Caribbean colony from Haiti. However, the Crown’s 
decision to reclaim Santo Domingo using diplomatic means did not originate from 
Madrid but it was rather the suggestion of Dominican exiles and the Catholic Church. 
This chapter evaluates Spain’s legal challenge and Boyer’s defense in determining who 
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had license to govern over the disputed territory. Also focus will be directed on how 
President Boyer dealt with the situation. 
  The return of Ferdinand VII to the throne in 1814 failed to bring equilibrium to 
Spain because the King was unable to mediate between the conservative and liberal 
philosophies that sought to reshape the monarchy. During the six-year French captivity 
(1808-1814) of Ferdinand VII, broad disapproval of French authority over Spain 
stimulated the citizenry to revolt in demand for the return of the “desired one” (Ferdinand 
VII) and the exit of the usurper, Napoleon’s brother Joseph.75 Meanwhile, liberal Juntas 
and the Regency governed in Ferdinand VII’s stead. They produced a constitution in 
1812 that significantly reduced the role of the Church and the Crown and elevated the 
liberties of the people. Upon his return to Madrid in 1814, Ferdinand VII used the 
masses, the army and the Church to invalidate this new liberal constitution.76 The debate 
over conservatism and liberalism, however, did not end there. Liberalism spread across 
the Atlantic, making a return to a conservative past unfeasible.  
Spain was polarized with the King at the center of the debate. With the 
Revolution of 1820 in Spain, the army and the masses turned against the Crown, placed a 
bankrupt Ferdinand VII under house arrest and restored the Constitution of 1812.77 The 
King’s reign was not restored until 1823 with the invasion from France of the Hundred 
Thousand Sons of St. Louis.78 By then, the reinstalled Ferdinand VII accepted the liberal 
consensus but the damage the debate inflicted on the Spanish empire was irreversible. 
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The invalidation of the Constitution of 1812 and the second removal of Ferdinand VII 
were major triggers to the waves of rebellion in Latin America that ultimately 
materialized into successful independence movements. Spanish control in the Americas 
was reduced to just the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Therefore, the effects of the 
Revolution of 1820 were not restricted to Spain. 
A closer look at the 1820 revolution in Spain shows that there was agreement 
between the military strategies implemented in Spain and those that the pro-Haitian 
affiliates adopted to cripple the political authority of Madrid over Santo Domingo in 
1821. In January 1820, two junior officers from within the government’s Andalusian 
expeditionary army “pronounced for the Constitution of 1812.”79 This pronouncement 
was a deliberate intervention of the military in political matters. It manifested a 
disagreement over the Crown’s philosophies concerning government. The “negative 
pronunciamiento” voiced military dissatisfaction with the Crown’s management of the 
economic troubles resultant since 1808 and it expressed frustration with the lack of 
fundamental civil rights within Spain.80 Specifically, the pronouncement demanded 
increased freedom of press, opening of public space and the eradication of feudal 
privileges. The proceedings in Spain mirror those employed in Santo Domingo prior to its 
annexation to Haiti. The pronouncements of Santo Domingo were produced just a few 
months after those of Spain and likewise military officers were their main champions. 
The pronouncements sought to challenge the political directive emanating from Madrid.  
Both pronouncements sided with the party the Crown rejected. In the case of 
Spain, the military defaulted in favor of the liberals, which Ferdinand VII tried to muffle. 
                                                 
79 Ibid., 124. 
80 Ibid., 126. 
 32 
In the case of Santo Domingo, all forces chose distance themselves from the Crown. 
More specifically, the military and the functionaries in the municipalities explicitly 
recognized the Haitian constitution as the supreme law; a document that the regency in 
the city of Santo Domingo rejected. In other words, it sought to redefine the implemented 
legal framework. Like the demands in Spain, the pronouncements of the Cibao petitioned 
for an end to specific infringements on liberties. In this case, they advocated for the 
emancipation of slaves. The pronouncement of Santiago specifically rejected the 
Constitutive Act of December 1 because it “maintains slavery disdaining the fundamental 
bases of every political society.”81 The document insists on emancipation when it states 
that the recognition of the Haitian constitution is attached with the “wish of general 
liberty for the slaves.”82 This challenge from Santiago was also stimulated because of 
disadvantageous economic conditions that defined local conditions from 1809 to 1821. 
The same document from Santiago explicitly condemns the Crown for demanding the 
service of soldiers without compensation. Therefore, it is possible that the 
pronouncements of 1821 in Monte Cristi and Dajabón were inspired more by the example 
from liberals in Madrid rather than from the order or suggestion of President Boyer.  
If Spanish liberal philosophy had such anti-colonial effects then why was Spain 
able to hold on to Cuba and Puerto Rico? An answer may lie in Hispaniola’s political 
impasse and restructuring from 1795 to 1822. Unlike the unfavorable effects that the 
Haitian Revolution had in Santo Domingo, both Cuba and Puerto Rico experienced 
tremendous economic and population gains from it. First, the turmoil in Saint-Domingue 
shifted the sugar export industry to Cuba and Puerto Rico. Powerful planters and 
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merchants in both these islands were pleased with the profit that resulted. The growing 
dependence on sugar made slavery the base of the economy in both of these islands. 
Second, the white flight that the Haitian Revolution produced within Santo Domingo 
helped to increase the population of its Spanish sisters in the Antilles. The influx of 
conservative migrants there also fortified their growing slave system. Thus, the exit of 
conservative and pro-Spain colonists weakened the political weight of said party in Santo 
Domingo while it strengthened the same in Habana and San Juan. In turn, a growth in the 
conservative elite strengthened the bond the islands had with Spain. The favoritism that 
Spain had developed for these two Caribbean colonies had now increased with the loss of 
its other colonies and the lucrative ascension of their agricultural production. The 
continuous out migration of whites from Santo Domingo permitted Boyer to annex the 
Eastern Part of Hispaniola with minimal objection from within Hispaniola.  
However, the emigration of political dissenters from a given society usually does 
not translate to a complete eradication of the opposition. The objection of these exiles to 
the Boyerian Movement would emanate from abroad. Influential Dominicans managed to 
relocate themselves within the high-ranking positions of the government of La Habana. 
With their newfound political influence these exiles were able to challenge their previous 
political adversaries from abroad. In this new society their political activity was no longer 
irregular but rather welcomed and even protected. When Boyer facilitated the departure 
of Dominican whites in 1822, he did not foresee that people like Felipe Fernández de 
Castro would undertake an insistent campaign to undermine Port-au-Prince’s 
administration of Santo Domingo. Fernández de Castro was the Controller General of 
Santo Domingo in 1822 and that same year would go into exile successfully positioning 
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himself as the Commissariat General of La Habana.83 As early as August 1822, 
Fernández de Castro requested Rafael Morán (the highest official at the Secretary of 
Hacienda of the Indies in Madrid) for “the temporary license” to visit his homeland to 
reclaim his patrimonial belongings and to determine the possible measures to recuperate 
the Crown’s possession of said colony.84 Why was it Fernández de Castro who took on 
this project and not another immigrant? How much property did he lose in Santo 
Domingo? The documentation available does not clarify either of these matters. 
Historians do concur that Fernández was not alone in the endeavor of returning Santo 
Domingo to Spanish control. Since 1822, Dominican emigrants residing in Cuba, Puerto 
Rico and Spain had mobilized, “playing all their cards to reach the Spanish monarch.”85 
These immigrants were displaced individuals who had lost much of their estate once 
Boyer expropriated them. The expropriation they considered as theft and felt annoyance 
at having to struggle in order to regain their prominence in lands that were already well 
populated by the affluent. However, they knew how to navigate the system and reach the 
ear of the monarch. The restoration of Spanish authority in Santo Domingo was important 
because it could facilitate the recuperation of their lost assets.  
Morán consented to this request and allowed Fernández to travel to Haiti in 
January 5, 1824. Once he arrived in the port of Cap-Haitien, Fernández explained that his 
travel was a response to the decree of February 8, 1823 that gave absent Dominicans four 
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months to claim their abandoned property.86 Although the allotted time for property 
reclamations had passed, Boyer agreed to meet with Fernández. In his account, 
Fernández observed that Boyer wanted to determine if Spain planned retaliation due to 
the loss of the colony. Boyer was highly diplomatic upon their encounter; supplying great 
details and credible reasons for why Santo Domingo had rightfully fallen under Haitian 
control and even agreeing to return all of Fernández belongings.87 Fernández wrote this 
account on July 6, 1824 as a survey of the conditions of the Eastern Part. The survey 
could give the Crown material that could strengthen their claims there. Since the account 
was originally written to persuade Spain to act, its depiction is clearly biased against 
Port-au-Prince. It provided a detailed and negative evaluation of the Boyer 
administration, citing recent local conspiracies in the East against the government and in 
favor of Spain, reported on the miserable salary of soldiers (two pesos per month), on the 
impediment of the free movement of blacks, of the poor access to education, and of 
Boyer’s inability to populate and develop the Eastern Part. The conclusion was simple: 
dissatisfaction with Boyer’s administration was widespread. 
Fernández’s account has much in common with Columbus’ letters to Spain 
written three centuries prior during his first voyages to the Americas. Both communiqués 
were directed to the Crown and sought to encourage Spain to invest in the colonization of 
Santo Domingo. Both confirmed local sympathy for Spanish colonialism, the colony’s 
strategic location and the inadequacy of present administration there. Like the Columbus 
before him, Fernández’s letter also exhibits flaws in its key arguments. Specifically, he 
concluded that Port-au-Prince saw no “advantages from [keeping] the Eastern Part” for it 
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is a “costly” and “an unfriendly neighbor.”88 However, Boyer’s defensive attitude and his 
efforts to show a more favorable depiction of his administration indicates continued 
interest in the annexed territory rather than disenchantment. Nonetheless, Fernández de 
Castro wrote and sent Madrid two other letters that were postmarked on July 8 and 11 
respectively. Both letters provided a recent historical background on Santo Domingo and 
emphasized that the residents of the Spanish Part “are disposed to gathering their efforts 
at the first cry” in favor of separation from Haiti.89 Fernández acknowledged that he was 
deeply invested in Santo Domingo’s recovery.  
Fernández’s investment in Santo Domingo, however, contrasts with Spain’s 
apathy. It took four years for Spain to formally endorse the committee for colonial 
restitution that Fernández requested. The National Archives of Cuba housed a “very 
reserved” text emanating from Madrid on August 24, 1829. This “soberana resolución” 
names “the Commissariat General of Cuba Sir Felipe Fernández de Castro in class of 
commissioner and in company of a trustworthy person that may serve as secretary and 
may be transferred in a ship of the Real Armada to Port-au-Prince with the objective of 
addressing the President of Hayti about the return to his Supreme Majesty of the Spanish 
Part of the island of Santo Domingo.”90 This resolución agrees to pay for possible costs 
that the commission may incur while in their stay at Haiti. Madrid opened by explaining 
that its internal problems in the recent past impaired her from exerting its “soft and 
paternal dominium” over Santo Domingo.  
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It then shifted to presenting its case for why it possessed the license to govern the 
territory in question. This letter encouraged the delegation to present Boyer with the 
following demands and conditions in diplomatic and friendly manner: Spain sought the 
return of its lost colony, once the restoration was effective Haiti would be compensated 
for the losses it may have incurred during their stay in the Eastern Part, there was no 
deadline for Haitian evacuation, and once the colony was returned Spain would recognize 
Haitian independence.91 In this “sovereign resolution” Madrid maintains a very generous 
tone that avoids conflict and appeals for a future accord on the issue. The reason behind 
the letter’s moderate tone may lie in the fact that for seven years Madrid neglected to 
emit even the softest whisper of objection after Boyer took control of the Eastern Part. 
Madrid may have expected Port-au-Prince to reject the claim that because of political 
turmoil it was unable to reclaim its colony. By 1829 (when the resolution was written), 
Madrid had enjoyed six years of stability. So if it was political instability that kept Spain 
from reclaiming its lost colony, then why did it not place its reclamation soon after 
stability was reinstituted in 1823? It was no news to anyone that Spain had a lukewarm 
relationship with Santo Domingo. Thus, the lack of urgency in Spain’s claim may be less 
the sign of diplomacy and more a sign of apathy. If it were not for Fernández’s persistent 
letters to induce Spain to act, it is doubtful that the Crown would have ordered such a 
mission. Spain’s indifference is confirmed by the delegation’s composition, which 
consisted of few or no political negotiators originating directly from Spain. Since the 
Crown did not dispatch one of its official advisors to command or even observe the 
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mission, one can infer that Spain did not intend to revisit the matter in the future if 
Fernández failed to deliver the lost colony. 
Once in Port-au-Prince, Fernández’s committee appeared to have employed a 
more forceful attitude than had been integrated within Madrid’s resolution of 1829. Upon 
their arrival, Boyer received the Crown’s delegates and immediately arranged for them to 
convene with General Baltazar Inginac, Senator Jean François Lespinasse and Coronel 
Marie Eustache Frémont on January 17 and 18 and later through written mode from 
January 19 through the 30th, 1830.92 As part of their claim, the Spanish delegation 
sustained that Haiti lacked the proper license to govern over the Eastern Part. 
Specifically, they stated that the Treaty of Paris of 1814 confirmed that Ferdinand VII 
enjoyed full authorization to govern the disputed territory. On the other hand, the Haitian 
constitution and the pronouncements from the East, they argued were not legitimate 
certificates that validated Haitian rights over the Eastern territory. Dominicans did not 
have the right to self-determination, unless his majesty had agreed to it. This right was 
reserved to the colonial state and not the colonist. And they sustained that Haiti’s 
constitution lacked international effect. There was no title under Haitian possession that 
Spain or any other international party endorsed that justified their camping in the East. 
The only international document that the Haitians possessed was the French ordnance of 
April 27, 1825. However, the document limited itself to recognizing the Haitian Republic 
as consisting of only the territory formerly known as Saint-Domingue. The commission 
clarified that the momentary occupation of said territory was warranted only if the 
occupier sought to protect the wellbeing of said population from an invading force. Such 
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invading force never existed. In conclusion, Fernández argued that Haiti’s entrance into 
Santo Domingo was irregular and its legitimate title-holder (Spain) requested an end to 
Haitian administration there.93 The delegation’s argument was direct, coherent and highly 
persuasive. The only piece the mission failed to possess was a French to Spanish 
translator.  
In contrast to Fernández’s tighter argument, Haiti’s defense had significant 
defects. The Haitians argued that the Peace of Basel of 1795 ceded the Eastern Part to 
France; Haiti occupied this territory since 1801 and was therefore since an integral part of 
the Haitian territory.94 This first argument was unconvincing since Haiti did not exist as a 
state until 1804 and disappeared from 1807 to 1819 after it was partitioned into two 
territories. Also, all annexationist excursions from the West to the East had failed until 
1822. This claim could not be verified for Haiti had no documentation that could confirm 
effective Haitian administration of the territory since 1801. The Haitian deputation also 
stated that from 1809 to 1821 Spain never objected to the Haitian Constitution, a 
document that clearly recognized the Eastern territory as integral. This assertion holds 
true for Spain and the city of Santo Domingo neglected to challenge the indivisibility 
clause of the Haitian Constitution although both were well aware of its language. 
However, Haiti was equally guilty of failing to present objection to another document. 
Haiti never objected to the Treaty of Paris of 1814, which returned Santo Domingo to 
Spanish control. In the contrary, Pétion and Christophe (the political heads of Southern 
and Northern Haiti respectively) had actually assisted in the War of 1809 to restore Santo 
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Domingo to Spanish control.95 Consequently, before 1821 Port-au-Prince lacked any 
official license to enter into Santo Domingo. It does not appear that Fernández´s 
delegation pointed out flaw in the Haitian’s defense. 
The Haitian delegation’s key claim to legitimacy was the pronouncements of the 
Eastern provinces. Haiti argued that the majority of inhabitants of the Eastern territory 
had officially recognized the Haitian constitution’s supremacy there by 1822. The failure 
of the French Ordinance of 1825 to recognize the Eastern territory as Haitian did not 
invalidate Haitian rights there. They concluded that Haiti would not cede any portion of 
its territory, nor abandon the citizens it agreed to protect. Even though Spain considered 
them as irrelevant, the pronouncements from the Cibao and the Southwest were a strong 
asset to Boyer’s defense. If the mother country refused to take charge of its colony, 
colonists had the right to part with it and determine their own destiny. Again Spain chose 
to overlook the well-accepted liberal understanding that sought to empower the people. 
The Spanish mission’s subsequent rebuttal on January 21 built upon their initial 
complaint. According to Fernández, the legitimacy of the pronouncements as reflecting 
the will of the people was no longer applicable since several revolts had shaken the 
Eastern Part since 1822, which sought to break away from Port-A-Prince.96 Fernández 
was specifically citing the alarming disturbances at Samaná in 1822, Alcarizos in 1824 
and other smaller revolts. Fernández continued to invalidate the pronouncements when he 
argued that if the people wanted separation, the colonial power had to recognize the 
validity of such request.97 The acquisition of any given territory must be achieved 
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through proper channels such as war, treaty or ultimatum, not through silence. A formal 
declaration of war or treaty was never adopted. At the end of the deliberation it was clear 
that the Spanish mission was winning the debate. Boyer intervened on January 30 and 
brought the deliberations to an abrupt culmination. Boyer stated that if there was no other 
subject besides the return of Santo Domingo that the Crown sought to address, the 
conference was now closed.98 
These deliberations sent chills across Haiti, as Port-au-Prince foresaw a Spanish 
invasion to or an internal revolt from the departments of Santo Domingo and the Cibao. 
Fernández’s mission failed to reach a diplomatic resolution to the issue and returned to 
La Habana empty handed. Still, the mission’s vitality and persistence put Port-au-Prince 
on the defensive. Fearing a naval invasion to the East from Puerto Rico, Boyer sent 
Coronel Tavares to Santiago, Coronel Moret to Samaná, and the Haitian army to Azua, 
San Juan de la Maguana, Montecristi, and La Vega.99 He also called for the doubling of 
agricultural production for the subsistence of troops. Also well-known sympathizers of 
Ferdinand VII were rounded up and persecuted. And Boyer ordered the removal and 
replacement of the Spanish coats of arms, which was stamped on public spaces, churches, 
convents, and substituted them with the republic’s in June 1830.100 Why did Boyer wait 
eight years to rid public spaces of the Spanish Crown’s seal? It is improbable that Boyer 
had considered the effect of such an emblem before the debate highlighted it. 
Nonetheless, Boyer wanted to ensure that Dominicans were not organizing in accordance 
with separatist ambitions. Boyer’s conspiracy theories concerning a Spanish invasion of 
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Santo Domingo arose at least a year before Madrid’s communiqué to Fernández de 
Castro in 1829. On November 16, 1828, General Gerónimo M. Borgella tried to debunk 
rumors that a diplomatic accord between Spanish and Haitian diplomats had restored the 
Eastern Part to Spanish colonial status.101 In his speech, he mentioned the interception of 
letters from San Juan and La Habana warning eminent invasion of the Spanish armada to 
reclaim the Eastern Part and explained that accordingly the presence of the Haitian army 
on that side of the island was strengthened. He warned that “if there was to be any 
turbulence in the public tranquility,” its instigators would be severely disciplined.102 
Boyer also wanted to discourage any discussion on the issue, particularly within mass 
homilies. Priests often used homilies to broadcast disapproval towards Boyerian policy.  
Consequently, as a result of Fernánde’s mission the most prevalent of the 
persecuted was the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Pedro Valera y Jiménez. Although the 
Church had hesitantly welcomed Haitians in 1822, it quickly grew averse to the Boyerian 
liberal thought. Boyer welcomed Protestantism and the Freemasonry, stripped the Church 
of its role in social services (particularly education and healthcare) and its authority over 
the processing of civil documentation such as certificates of marriage, birth, and death.103 
The relationship between President Boyer and Archbishop Valera was strained also 
because Valera refused to satisfy Boyer’s request for the archdiocese to administer the 
disorganized Church in Haiti. Valera’s faithfulness to Ferdinand VII was unwavering and 
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his interest in cooperating with Haiti was minimal.104 Although the Archbishop was not 
directly involved with Fernández’s mission in 1830, with the end of the deliberations 
Port-au-Prince considered him persona non grata. Both Pérez Memen and Nouel argue 
that Haitian authority’s irritation with the bishop escalated to the point that they arranged 
for his assassination. The assassin, Romero, failed to carry out the order and Valera was 
forced into exile to La Habana on July 23, 1830.105  
Why did Boyer wait until July to expel the Archbishop if the deliberations ended 
in February? There must have been another altercation between the Church and Boyer 
that stimulated this confrontation. Again, the sources available make no reference to such 
an event. Nonetheless, Valera was highly popular in the city of Santo Domingo and, 
therefore, the general Dominican population did not receive favorably his exit and 
attempted assassination. The Church was the main influential body that remained in the 
Eastern Part after the annexation. Consequently, the expulsion of Valera was not only 
unwarranted but also counterproductive. Boyer was confronting his opposition using 
force rather than diplomacy. His increased coercive strategy would soon backfire 
transforming him from the “pacifier” to the instigator. The victimization of the Church 
brought the Dominicans masses to identify very strongly with this institution and grow 
increasingly disheartened with Port-au-Prince.  
Boyer would realize belatedly that Fernández de Castro’s mission lacked 
substantial military force. He dispersed his troops in the aftermath of the conference in 
order to be cautious and prepared. But it was again an unnecessary display of force that 
must have produced discomfort in an already annoyed population. Indeed, Fernández’s 
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mission was forceful in their demands but they arrived with a single warship. 106 The 
limited quantity of the force that accompanied Fernández’s commission in January 1830 
should have given Boyer an indication of Spain’s minimal interest in the recuperation of 
Santo Domingo. The contrast in military muscle of the French Ordinance of 1825 and 
that of Spain in 1830 was significant; the French did not arrive with a tone of pacific 
discussion as had Spain but with stern compulsion. Haiti could not alter the Ordinance; it 
was to be ratified promptly and unaltered and its implementation was immediate. Thus, 
Boyer’s defensive response to the conference manifested itself as groundless paranoia. As 
was to be expected, Spain silently acknowledged the loss of Santo Domingo. It never 
invaded nor did it readdress the subject of reclamation in any other diplomatic forum. 
The fact that it was Fernández and other Dominicans that pushed for the effort rather than 
Madrid, shows that from the beginning the soverana resolución was a onetime 
arrangement intended to satisfy the insistent whim of a displaced people. 
 In effect, the tangible efforts of the Catholic Church and the Dominican exile 
community did not awaken Spain’s interest in Santo Domingo. Although Fernández’s 
delegation made their case well, Spain opted out of the reclamation effort and thus 
solidified Port-au-Prince’s effective hold over the Eastern Part. Spain’s indifference here 
is peculiar for an empire that fought against its disintegration. Spain’s disregard for Santo 
Domingo could no longer be explained through civil unrest in Madrid. Indeed, it never 
had been. Spain had forgotten about Santo Domingo since the Peace of Basel in 1795 
when it was ceded to France. With French confirmation of Haitian sovereignty and 
Spain’s lack of interest in Santo Domingo, it became evident that no other colonial power 
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would try to interfere directly in Haiti. Boyer’s response to Fernández’s mission, 
however, strained the support he had established in the East. When it came to its hold 
over Santo Domingo, Boyer had won the battle against international forces but, as we 
will examine in the next chapter, he was losing the battle at home.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
BOYER’S HAITI: THE THREAT OF ACCRUED DEBT AND RACISM 
 
  With the unification of the North, South, and East Boyer had quadrupled his 
territorial command and demarcated the surrounding sea as the only recognizable border 
of the Haitian Republic. By 1822, his diplomatic campaign and the strategic segregation 
of functionaries had allowed him to consolidate politically an island that was previously 
splintered because of political distinctions. The failure of his challengers (Christophe, 
Núñez de Cáceres, and Ferdinand VII) to promptly respond to local demands and mediate 
among factions were fundamental circumstances that allowed Boyer to fulfill the 
indivisibility clause of the Haitian Constitution. Although Boyer’s accomplishment was 
sizeable, it lacked international scope. After almost two decades with effective and 
resilient sovereignty, Haiti still lacked international recognition as a nation-state. Boyer 
understood that if Haiti was to grow economically, its integration among nations was 
fundamental.  
However, Boyer had overestimated the strength of the federation he had recently 
created. Diplomacy had delivered optimism to Haitians but was far from establishing 
lasting unison. Boyer was able to amalgamate Haiti but the nation was nothing more than 
a cracked glass; splintered because of linguistic, cultural and ethnic differences. He 
managed to preserve this cracked glass for twenty years through policies that kept 
Haitians uneducated and without access to reliable infrastructure. Also, Boyer built an 
enduring base of support by engendering a local peasantry through massive redistribution 
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of land and the eradication of slavery in the East. However, Boyer quickly made foreign 
affairs a priority leaving domestic policy often inadequately formulated and executed. His 
increased investment in diplomatic affairs resulted in French recognition of the Haitian 
Republic in 1825. The recognition came at a cost that was incongruent with nation’s 
revenue capability. Boyer would spend the subsequent years trying to placate popular 
frustration with the newly incurred debt. In addition, Boyer’s constant disregard for social 
services and the abundance of state-sponsored racial discrimination impaired the process 
of nation building. These errors would culminate in the spectacular unraveling of his 
administration.  
 Boyer contrasted with his predecessor for he was able to use diplomatic and 
military tools in conjunction to expand his political support within all of Hispaniola. The 
Haitian Revolution ensued in a two decades civil war that petrified locals and the 
international observer alike for its sanguineous propensity and its deep racial hostility. 
The Revolution left Haiti consumed in indefinite civil unrest and economic decline. 
Military betrayal brought the demise of Toussaint Louvature and Henri Christophe. 
Massacre and assassinations defined the rule of Jean-Jacques Dessalines and famine that 
of Alexander Pétion. Moreover, it was aggression that had brought all of these leaders to 
power. However, Boyer was a transition from this precedent. After the natural death of 
Pétion in 1818, Boyer rose to power in a quick, smooth, legal and bloodless procedure; a 
first since the start of the Revolution in 1791.107 The then forty-year old leader opted to 
continue with Pétion’s mild republicanism instead of Christophe’s imperial system. The 
contrast in the living conditions between the North and South was very wide, a fact that 
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increasingly favored Boyer for the South had a less oppressive system. Specifically, 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot explains that hundreds of Haitians died constructing Christophe’s 
palace of Sans Souci; some because of harsh labor and others “because they faced a firing 
squad for a minor breach in discipline.”108 Christophe’s authoritarian regime had installed 
a robust economy in the North. He also attributed greater importance to education then 
his counterpart had in the South. But his administration was destined to expire due to 
inefficiency with regards to the organization of advisors. In August 1820, the military 
split after many of its top officers demanded to overthrow Christophe, who ultimately 
committed suicide rather than be a witness to his own demise.109 As the regime to the 
North collapsed, Boyer marched with a small army to claim control there. Instead of 
calling for a blood bath of all of Christophe’s supporters, Boyer called for the composure 
from all parties. He had arranged for the protection and relocation of the wife and 
daughters of Christophe, escorting them as guests first to Port-au-Prince and later to 
England.110 James Franklin does not directly associate Boyer with any murder that 
transpired there instead he paints Boyer as a pacifier who acted quickly to placate the 
uprising. It takes a persuasive figure to penetrate an insurrection with a small force and 
bring about the subjugation of its people without resorting to aggression. Consequently, 
Haitians soon called him the “benefactor” and the “unifier.”111  
Boyer succeeded in his expansionist efforts because of patience and rhetorical 
persuasion. Similar to his procedure in the North, Boyer managed to absorb its eastern 
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Spanish neighbor without resorting to the use of force.112 As explained in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, Boyer had vigorously invested in polishing his image among locals there. He 
waited for an invitation into the territory, which came more than a year after the 
consolidation of the northern and southern territories in August 1820. He was determined 
to follow the legal protocol for territorial annexation rather than resorting to a coerce 
invasion. Again, he was not the first Haitian leader to covet Santo Domingo. In particular, 
Christophe hoped to use much of his abundant treasury (nine million francs) to purchase 
Santo Domingo from Spain.113 This approach proved inconclusive after years of force 
labor decimated Christophe’s popular base that increasingly viewed him as despotic. 
Boyer did not wish to buy Santo Domingo (granted Boyer no capital to complete such a 
purchase) or to take it by force. He wanted the colony to join his tutelage on its own 
account.  
His calculating and paced proceeding may have been an effort to erect a nation 
that was based on his personality. Creating a favorable legacy appeared to be almost an 
obsession for Boyer for twice he explicitly rejected his cataloging as a “conquistador” 
and instead favored the classification of “pacifier” and “conciliator.”114 Boyer’s 
clarification is explicit in his letter to Núñez de Cáceres on January 11, 1822 and in the 
verbal address he made upon arriving to Santo Domingo on February 9, 1822. Once 
there, as an act of humility, Boyer reportedly rejected the keys of the city, which Núñez 
de Cáceres offered to him.115 With such an action Boyer might have attempted to channel 
the icon status that had kept Pétion in power until death. His soft seeming authoritarian 
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command stimulated the respect and support of the masses. Boyer had played the game 
well, marching into both the North and Santo Domingo as a pacifier that effectively 
placated an imminent civil war. However, Boyer is to some extent the instigator of these 
internal conflicts. He was always behind the background persuading and misinforming 
generals and state functionaries in order to sway them to his cause and away from their 
respective administrators in Cap-Haitien and the city of Santo Domingo. The strategy 
worked like a charm; showcasing to those closest to Boyer his competence in diplomatic 
manipulation. But if Santo Domingo was a wretched colony and therefore a possible 
burden to develop why was Boyer so interested in annexing it? 
Boyer annexed both the North and the East in order to consolidate his power and 
eliminate the competition. Juan Bosch argues that Boyer sought the annexation of Santo 
Domingo as a vehicle to consolidate the resulting surplus of generals that previously 
composed Christophe’s military entourage.116 With the incorporation of a vast and under 
populated territory, Boyer could form new municipalities and garrisons and appoint this 
surplus of politically divergent generals to administrate them. The relocation and strategic 
segregation of Christophe’s former associates to a distant land allowed for Boyer to 
secure his authority over Port-au-Prince. Therefore, it is Bosch’s argument that the 
annexation of Santo Domingo was a necessary byproduct in order to preserve the 
unification of northern and southern Haiti. José Gabriel García agrees with Bosch citing 
that only with the incorporation of said territory could Haiti overcome the wars among 
interests, specifically between castas or wars among races.117  
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However, Juan Martínez Almanzar flatly rejects Bosch’s argument. Martínez 
argues that the aspiration to annex Santo Domingo existed long before Christophe’s 
suicide.118 Certainly the attempt to appropriate the Eastern territory was a cause that all of 
Boyer’s predecessors championed. According to British and Foreign State Papers of 
1821-22, it was Boyer who in 1806 proposed an article to that year’s constitution that 
“declared the entire island of Santo Domingo as comprising an indivisible republic.”119 
Most politicians of the time agreed that having a defenseless and desolate colony in the 
East was greatly disadvantageous for the protection of the republic. Therefore, Price-
Mars affirms that the annexation of Santo Domingo was an “absolute necessity” that 
Boyer would have pursued even if the pronouncements of the eastern provinces were 
never forged.120 Nevertheless, Boyer actively pursued and waited for the 
pronouncements’ legalizing effect. The pronouncements functioned as international 
accords with local officials that could be used if ever a foreign or local authority 
questioned the validity of the annexation. Thus, Bosch’s argument just does not hold 
since even with Santo Domingo under his wing, Boyer would ultimately lose control over 
the military and political structure he presided over. In fact, the greatest threat to the 
infant unification was not military disagreement but racial, social and political inequality. 
With a larger and more diverse field to govern, Boyer would be tested on his 
ability to consolidate this different and larger Haiti. By February 1822, Boyer’s agenda 
should have included the following national issues: emigration and land abandonment, 
racial discrimination, linguistic and cultural divergence, investment in human capital, 
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improvement of infrastructure, fortification of the export economy, the creation of a local 
peasantry, the establishment of new municipalities and appointment of their respective 
administrators and diplomatic recognition of the Republic. Boyer chose to focus first on 
economics and the restructuring of the political apparatus. Boyer’s first policy change 
was the abolition of slavery in accordance with the demand of the pronouncement of 
Santiago. Roberto Cassa indicates that the emancipation of slaves was not wide in scope 
or significance for the newly acquired territory only encompassed eight thousand slaves 
or about eleven percent of the total population of Santo Domingo.121 Thus, the 
eradication of slave labor in 1822 did not translate to a mayor economic transformation in 
Santo Domingo for the economy was minimally dependent on it. The recent and extended 
struggle for freedom in the West had progressively drained Santo Domingo of its 
developing latifundista sector through the emigration of much of its ruling class. With the 
abandonment of the large estates, slavery did not expand as did in Puerto Rico and Cuba. 
The conditions of slaves in the East were increasingly dissimilar to those who had been 
slaves in the West. James Franklin confirms this scenario when he elucidates that “there 
were but few slaves in this part of the island, and those were living in so great a state of 
equality with the people, that slavery was only known by name, and they evinced no 
desire whatever to throw off their adherence to their masters, and join their brethren of 
the West.122 Other primary accounts, such as that of Jonathan Brown and John Candler, 
agree that slaves on the Spanish side enjoyed a more paternalistic relationship with their 
masters and consequently explains why they were disinclined to replicate a slave 
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revolution in the East.123 Nevertheless, by 1821 emancipation was a widely desired 
objective in the East. 
Congruently, the emancipation of slaves should not be belittled. Why would the 
pronouncement of Santiago specifically demand for emancipation if it were not 
significant? The effect of eleven percent of the population is not as small as statistics may 
indicate and as Cassa sustains. If slaves lived in such harmony with the free, it is possible 
that the free desired the improvement of slaves’ condition. There may have existed a 
close association between the small slave community and the more substantive free 
mulatto population in Santo Domingo. Nevertheless, Boyer’s economic policies would 
significantly benefit the rural and Afro community of Santo Domingo. A large portion of 
the emancipated (then called the “liberated of the palm”) was drafted into the military to 
compose Battalion 32.124 This newfound position of authority was a significant ascension 
for men that were previously destined for just one occupation: brute hard labor. The 
success of these early measures gave Boyer significant momentum to continue policies 
that ensured both effective security and the establishment of a peasantry.  
The next step was the incorporation of the Eastern Part into the managerial 
political body. Among his first measures was redefining political divisions of the state 
that in 1822 now constituted six departments: the North, Gonaives, West, South, Ozama 
and Cibao.125 The last two departments consisted of the entire territorial area of the 
former Spanish colony and as mandated by the decree of February 27, they were now 
entitled to nominate delegates to the legislative Chamber of Deputies for a five-year term. 
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The delegation represented lower districts called communes of which include: Santo 
Domingo, Las Matas de Farfán, San Juan, Neiva, Azua, Bani, Seibo, Higuey, Samaná, 
Cotuí, La Vega, Santiago, Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi.126 The representation in the 
Chamber between west and east was unequal but proportional since Santo Domingo was 
greatly under populated. As for the Senate, all of the Spanish Part was allowed one 
representative, Antonio Martínez Valdez, which was elected for a nine-year term.127 The 
historiography does not indicate if Martínez remained as senator for the twenty-two years 
or if there was ever a successor, leaving many to believe that Santo Domingo lacked 
senate representation for much of the 1830s. The representative inequality within the 
Senate is significant since, this body had greater influence and access to the President 
than the Chamber of Deputies. The voice of Dominicans would be greatly muffled by the 
preponderance of Haitians within the Senate. President Boyer would also silence 
Dominican political participation by making municipal governance there presidentially 
appointed positions. Congruently, he appointed trustworthy Dominicans and Haitians to 
these posts, functionaries who may have not even spoken the language of the people they 
governed in the East. 
The nomination of Haitian military and political elite to municipal government 
positions in the East intentionally disempowered the local white elite. The city of Santo 
Domingo had always been the center of the Hispanic and Catholic consensus within the 
island. The city’s resolution to undermine Port-au-Prince’s unification efforts with the 
declaration of Spanish Hayti in 1821 would render all of its sponsors as unqualified for 
political activity. Similarly to how he dealt with the residual military forces of 
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Christophe’s regime, Boyer sought to dispel the base of the pro-Hispanic party within 
Santo Domingo. The effect of the discrimination against divergent parties was obvious, 
culminating in the emigration of conservative elites of such as José Núñez de Cáceres, 
who relocated to Venezuela and later to Mexico.128 With the exit of Santo Domingo’s 
main political architect, Boyer hoped to strengthen his support base within the city, which 
had traditionally been very weak. This move is a classic political strategy known today as 
the spoils or patronage system, employed by presidents such as Andrew Jackson. 
However, making politics exclusive was contrary to the unification effort that the 
republic required. In a recently integrated society that suffers from resounding cultural, 
linguistic, religious and racial diversity, the practice of the spoils system is 
counterproductive to the confederacy for the variety of representative voices is shut out 
from government. Rather than governing as delegates, public officials mandate without 
representative legitimacy. In essence, Boyer was diverging from his diplomatic 
propensity and establishing a system that echoed only his own ideas. This echoing effect 
would be problematic since Boyer’s liberal ideals contrasted heavily with Dominican 
conservatism and it disfavored Haitian blacks. 
The political silencing of the pro-Hispanic party transferred congruently to the 
economic policies that Port-au-Prince opposed. One of the first and major policy 
excursions was the redistribution of lands in Santo Domingo on October 12, 1822. The 
decree stated that the state would confiscate 1) the property belonging to the Spanish and 
French Crown, 2) the convents, ecclesiastical hospitals, chapels and all mortgage of the 
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Cathedral, and 3) property of all absentees and political criminals.129 There was vast 
extends of fertile lands that were uninhabited and thus unproductive. For instance, in 
1809 Dorvo Saulastre notes that there was only a small hamlet between Cotuí and the city 
of Santo Domingo, a distance of 105 km.130 Considering that migration from the Eastern 
Part only increased after that year, it must follow than that population decreases only 
worsened by 1822. Therefore, Boyer had to address land redistribution and population 
growth if agriculture was to develop in the East. The republic was within its rights to 
expropriate Crown’s territory and to regulate the exploitation of these abandoned lands. 
However, the expropriation of the Church’s and emigrants’ property was 
counterproductive to Boyer’s efforts to gain a support base in the city of Santo Domingo. 
Among the first to protests were the relatives of the absent who deemed themselves as the 
legitimate keepers of these estates. The indignation was so great that on February 8, 
1823, Boyer would decree that immigrants could reclaim their lands if they returned 
within four months to live permanently in Haiti.131 Few answered this timeline and thus 
much of the land was eventually confiscated. More importantly, the decree was widely 
unpopular among Catholics. The Church and peasants who exploited ecclesiastical land 
were the most injured by the law. The Church was being sacked of its several hospitals, 
all of its rents and even its lodging (five convents and all within their premises). Although 
the legislature approved the measure, the Church deemed it unlawful for it trampled over 
its constitutional rights of private property and unrepresentative because the legislature 
was a pawn of Boyer and not of the masses. The state’s sequestering of ecclesiastical 
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property was not a policy simply adopted in Haiti but also in neighboring infant states 
such as Mexico. This assail on the Church’s property rights was a byproduct of the 
liberalism emanating after the French Revolution, which sought to check the Church’s 
power by regulating its economic influence. Much of the confiscated property was 
intended to propel a land reform that sought to establish a local peasantry. Unlike the 
emancipation efforts in Brazil and the United States, Haiti in fact donated land to the 
freed so that they could engage in independent agriculture.132 The concept of attaching 
emancipation to economic freedom was a sound undertaking. Political liberty is not 
conducive to freedom if the venue for degradation is primarily a financial one.  
Nevertheless, the Church was distraught with the proceedings. The Governor of 
the Department of Ozama, General Gerónimo Borgella, was selling for his own profit 
much of the sequestered property to friends or awarding them to military officers and 
functionaries of the republic rather than to peasants and the freed.133 This expropriation 
was clearly tainted with corruption and it disproportionately favored a few affluent 
Haitians at the expense of white criollos and Catholics. Accordingly, the Church felt 
victimized and effectively subjugated. Essentially, the dispossession of the Archdiocese 
of Santo Domingo was yet another strategy to decapitate the economic stronghold that 
whites enjoyed in Santo Domingo and that Boyer saw as threatening to his 
administration. However, the expropriations did not attempt to expel the Church from the 
island. Boyer was not the epitome of anti-clericalism as many would like to paint him. As 
Fernando Pérez Memen points out, Boyer had invited Archbishop Valera to administrate 
                                                 
132 Moya Pons, La Dominación Haitiana, 45. 
133 Peréz, 473. 
 58 
the Church of western Haiti and to relocate his seat in Puerto-Au-Prince, offer which the 
Valera rejected in good reason.134  
Nevertheless, the decision to dispossess the Archdiocese of Santo Domingo was 
by all measures detrimental to the nascent confederacy. The Church enjoyed tremendous 
popularity within Santo Domingo; they had been the only entity to remain within the 
colony throughout its various political transitions in the three hundred year history of 
western European presence. No matter how popular Boyer had become over the past four 
years, his popularity was incomparable to that of the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, 
Pedro Valera y Jiménez. The popular backing of the Church would manifest itself with 
the formidable incident at the Alcarizos in February 1824, which sought to reinstate 
Ferdinand VII’s command over Santo Domingo.135 The failed projected of Alcarizos 
involved the participation of a diverse and prominent membership: three captains of the 
National Guard, a clergyman, sub-lieutenants, several policeman, members of the elite 
and many regular private citizens. The diversity, scope and organization of this incident 
showed that Boyer’s recent legal undertakings were simply unsatisfactory. Concurring 
that the extent of Church expropriations was excessive and detrimental, the legislature 
had to amend the expropriation law on July 8, 1824, and designated Catholic priests and 
nuns as state salaried functionaries, an offer which the Archdiocese also rejected.136 As 
with the amendment that granted immigrants four months to return and reclaimed their 
sequestered property, Port-au-Prince was resorting to amending recent laws that were 
obviously incongruent with public sentiments. The inefficiency of Boyer’s administration 
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was manifesting itself with these amendments. Even with pronounced manifestation of 
disapproval, however, the legislative body would continue to disregarded the popular will 
and retract on policies it should have not passed in the first place. The continuation of the 
spoils system as means to govern a diverse and disjointed population would subject all 
future economic legislation to similar paths of disapproval and early expiration. 
Port-au-Prince’s focus on property regulation went beyond the premises of the 
Church. In the first three years, Boyer was determined to reanimate the economy’s pre-
Dessalines dynamism but these early policies were contradictory to that goal. In 1823, 
Boyer suspended all commercial communications between Haiti and the other islands in 
the Caribbean. The first law specifically terminated the profitable and diverse trade 
between the ports of Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi with Jamaican ports.137 This 
impediment diminished demand severely troubling the outlet for the agricultural goods 
(such as tobacco, rice, beans, peas, Indian corn, mahogany, horned cattle and dye-wood) 
produced in La Vega Real. This policy specifically disfavored the very eastern region that 
had welcomed Boyer with open arms, the Cibao. If Boyer sought to fortify Haitian 
economic activity then why did he obstruct already existent profitable trading venues?  
The historiography bypasses this early policy in order to analyze the more 
alienating effects of successive economic policies. But such bypass of Boyer’s first 
political excursions can conceal much about the leader’s early agenda. On April 12, 1823 
the Niles Weekly Register published and translated Boyer’s isolationist proclamation. In 
it Boyer explained that the decree was warranted because the adjacent islands and the 
communities on the mainland had the “most embittered slanders” that insulted “our 
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national character” and depicted Haiti as an aggressor. 138 Furthermore, these states 
supported the “traffic in human flesh,” and encourage “smuggling” into Haiti. With this 
isolationist policy Boyer may have also been trying to use commerce to compel its 
neighbors to reconsider their support for Haiti’s political isolation. Frank Moya Pons 
adds that Haiti isolated itself commercially because these communities saw Port-au-
Prince’s presence within the Spanish side as illegal.139 Nevertheless, only merchants who 
became naturalized citizens of Haiti were allowed to sustain commercial interaction with 
places such as Curacao and Saint Thomas.140 The effectiveness of the policy is doubtful 
although islands like Saint Thomas immediately asked Port-au-Prince to retract this 
measure and new political dialogue did follow.  
In general this policy and those following distressed those in the East. People on 
the Spanish lobbied to unify with Haiti because they sought to expand their consumer 
base and develop their commercial potential. The isolationist policy of 1823 had the 
adverse effect. The following economic policy that Boyer legislated in 1823 presented 
yet another abrupt disruption to commercial traditions, the eradication of communal land 
rights.141 Dominicans saw this as unnecessary interference on traditional patronage. 
Boyer saw it more as a regulation of property titles. It was an effort to develop a 
productive relationship between people and land. By 1824, Boyer had delivered 
substantial land reform. Out of the 316,544 people living in the French side 126,617 were 
landed property owners and the remaining 189, 927 were exploiting the land either as 
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squatters or salaried laborers.142 Nevertheless, now that the state had acquired and 
regulated all this land how did it ensure that it was put to productive use?  
In order to jump start the economic performance of the island, Boyer passed the 
Rural Code in 1826. The Code attempted to reinforce a system of agricultural feudalism 
based on a system of compulsory labor, which generated exportable products.143 All 
except state functionaries were compelled to work under a contractor, all those who 
wished to set up shop in towns rather than work in agriculture needed to obtain a legal 
license from a Justice of the Peace and children were expected to continue their parents’ 
occupation rather than attend schools.144 The Code obstructed the free movement of 
labor, discouraged entrepreneurship and education. Like the economic policies before it, 
it tried to meddle with key cultural diversions of the Eastern Part. Specifically, the Code 
abbreviated the plethora of saint's days and outlawed cockfighting except for Sundays in 
order to discourage worker idleness.145 The infringement reached across both religious 
and secular cultural traditions, indicating an unwarranted broadening in the power of 
government. For decades, both Southern Haitians and Dominicans were greatly 
accustomed to soft and distant governments. However, the Code was the return of a long 
forgotten encomienda like system that attempted to coerce people into labor. Due to its 
radical authoritarian nature, the Rural Code was unsuccessful. As Roberto Marte points 
out, the new system fell short of completely breaking with pre-capitalists traditions.146 
For example, workers were not compensated through a fixed salary but were entitled to a 
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portion of the rent that the land generated. Due to their inability to opt out of such labor 
the recent emancipation and the land reform were deficient in quality. Not only was the 
legislature continuing to pass policy that was out of tune with the attitude of the masses 
but also these laws were in direct opposition to the previous ones. Boyer’s first decrees 
sought to develop an independent peasantry though emancipation, land reform, and the 
drafting of freed males. The Rural Code was simply incompatible with these previous 
economic reforms for it involved coerce labor and a continuation of slave like 
employment proceeding. The policy was an effort to remedy the deficit inherent with the 
ratification of an international treaty.  
The Rural Code was a desperate byproduct of the French Ordinance of 1825. On 
July 3, 1825, French envoy Baron Mackau arrived with three warships (carrying white 
flags) to deliver a treaty to Port-au-Prince, which recognized its former colony of Saint-
Domingue as the newly constituted Republic of Haiti.147 France was the first nation to 
recognize Haiti, a distinction that Boyer and all Haitians alike had desired with earnest. 
However, King Charles X had placed a price tag on the newfound independence of 150 
million francs to be paid in five annual installments.148 The money would serve as 
reimbursement for the French plantation owners that were dispossessed and displaced 
with the Haitian Revolution. The Ordinance involved an unprecedented fee for 
diplomatic recognition and was especially ludicrous for a state that still struggled to 
reanimate its economy. As Price-Mars explains, the treaty is coined today the “French 
Ordinance” for it did not lend itself to any significant reform from the Haitian party.149 In 
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other words, Mackau was not empowered to make any further negotiation when in Haiti. 
It should be noted that it was President Boyer himself who proposed the idea of 
indemnification for state recognition without fixing a numerical figure to such 
reimbursement.150 Port-au-Prince had been courting Paris and other world capitals for 
years with the idea of recognition. This proactive diplomacy turned reckless as the 
ratified treaty effectively diminished the de facto independence that was already at hand 
by placing the national treasury in a state of prolonged indebtedness. Essentially, King 
Charles X had put Boyer’s diplomatic appeal to the test and it had failed miserably. 
Robert Lacarte argues that with the Ordinance, Charles X intended to slowdown Haitian 
economic interaction with Great Britain and the U.S. and maintain Haiti locked within 
the French economic orbit. Certainly, Haiti was Britain’s third largest economic partner, 
claiming half of all Haitian exports in 1832.151 The treaty sought to divert Haitian exports 
away from London (Paris’ main competitor), the sabotage would stimulate further 
Haitian distrust of the Caucasian community and curtail the development of a profitable 
relationship with the British.   
Boyer ratified the treaty not because of naïveté but because of international 
isolation and French pressure. London, Washington, and other capitals refused to 
recognize Port-au-Prince in part because of its pronounced constitutional bias against 
whites, which were not allowed to own land.152 The impediment for foreigners to own the 
means of production placed Haiti as a place where foreign investment was tactless. With 
the Ordinance Paris was guaranteeing Haitians an end to French invasions and economic 
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reassurance, offer that no other state had presented. The offer was seductive but Boyer 
understood that Haiti lacked the means to fiscally sustain the accord. The treasury was 
depleted and the economic reforms already implemented had failed to stimulate 
commerce. In addition, the Ordinance did not supply any venues for significant profit for 
Haitians. Under the treaty, all French merchandise would enter the Haitian market free of 
import taxes for the first five years, after these five years expired said export would only 
pay half duties and enter ports with preferential status.153 In addition, any Haitian imports 
entering French ports would pay discounted tariffs. The treaty was akin to a free trade 
agreement. Haitians could not benefit from such a partnership for there was no capital at 
home with which to purchase goods and infrastructure was unsatisfactory for the 
transport of products from the interior to the ports. The Ordinance further complicated 
matters when it failed to recognize Haiti as encompassing the whole island, thus 
excluding the former Spanish colony of Santo Domingo from the agreement.154 
Therefore, Haitian expansion into the East was deemed irregular. 
So, if Haiti consisted of only the French side of the island, was Paris basing the 
150 million francs settlement fee on Saint-Domingue’s revenue prior to 1790? The 
historiography does not expand on the tools Paris used to arrive at the 150 million francs 
indemnification price. Nevertheless, the 30 million expected as the first yearly 
installment was incongruent with the island-wide revenue of 1825. Thus, in order to 
increase the gross domestic product Boyer put forth the ambitious Rural Code and 
compelled Dominican cities to share in the economic burden when it requested that they 
contribute 4.5 million gourdes (the then national currency in Haiti) annually to accredit 
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the debt.155 Although Dominicans were only responsible for paying fifteen percent of the 
annual installment, many felt that the East had no debt to pay to France. In their defense, 
the treaty consciously excluded Dominicans as parties in the settlement. Why should 
Dominicans pay for damages resulting from a revolution that they had not been a part of? 
The passage of the Rural Code only aggravated the displeasure that the signing of the 
Ordinance caused a few months prior. The forced labor that the Rural Code sponsored 
further infuriated citizens on both parts for they saw it as a crude trampling of their 
constitutional rights of liberty and to state protection. Specifically, article 178 stated that 
children would be compelled to work along side their parents rather than seeking a 
divergent condition.156 This was a continuation of slave like policy that derogated 
residents to a fixed profession. Although Haiti had been triumphant during the revolution, 
it was being compelled to pay a defeated enemy. Also, Dominicans felt deceived by 
Boyer’s promises of military and economic incubatory protection. If the Ordinance and 
the Code were so widely unpopular, how did Boyer’s administration survive such a 
mistake?  
Although the elite deemed the recent international accord disadvantageous, their 
dissatisfaction with the regime did not escalate to destabilizing effect for Haiti did 
experience significant gains from 1820 to 1830. Population growth within the Spanish 
Part accelerated quickly surpassing that net growth in other countries of the time.157 
Roberto Marte claimed that this growth was a byproduct of Boyer’s land reform. There 
was significant growth in the harvest and exportation of mahogany, logwood, and 
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tobacco and stability in the sale of cacao.158 Most of these crops were grown on the Cibao 
and Southwest, regions that had sponsored the Boyerian Movement of 1821. These crops 
were more adequate for small plot holders for they did not require massive labor.159 To 
some degree, the profitable situation of these merchants allowed Boyer to hold on to 
power. The credit they acquired helped ease the regnant absence of capital that kept 
Boyer under constant problems of deficit and paper money deflation.160  
The other factor that saved Boyer’s administration was the quick eradication of 
many of the unpopular policies adopted. The implementation of the Rural Code extended 
itself for less then a year. Acknowledging the severe unpopularity that both the Ordinance 
and the Code had produced, in 1827 Boyer decided abolished the Rural Code.161 The 
Ordinance was the only policy he could not retract, and which led to the adoption of 
further debt from French banks in order to pay each installment (Haiti did not possess any 
banks at the time). In short, his administration survived the alienating effects of these 
policies because by 1830, Boyer had heavily invested in land and population 
redistribution, stimulated the growth of a local peasantry, strengthen the tobacco and 
mahogany industry in the East, obtained diplomatic recognition from France and later 
from Great Britain and effectively fought off Spanish reclamation for Santo Domingo. 
Also, Boyer was still less authoritarian then both Dessalines and Christophe. 
Nevertheless, he overlooked two fundamental problems within Haitian de facto 
management: de jure racial discrimination and underinvestment in human capital. 
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 Boyer was unconcerned with the racial exclusive environment within Haiti. In 
1804 Haiti became the first Black republic, a distinction which mulattos and blacks 
everywhere found laudable. For mulattos on the Cibao, the political entity across the 
border was not an arbitrary construction but a society they admired and wish to join. 
However, Dessalines, Pétion, and Boyer and to a lesser extent Christophe were hesitant to 
incorporate whites as contributors and members of the nascent nation-state. Haitian 
independence came riding on a wave of racial bias. The mutual racially charged 
condescension and the manipulation that resulted between blacks and whites stimulated 
Haitians to declare within article 14 of the Constitution of 1805 that all Haitians would be 
“denominated generically as blacks.”162 Equating nationalism with race was 
understandable for Saint-Domingue had fervently coalesced around the idea of black 
freedom and black empowerment. It presented itself as a safe haven for all blacks within 
the Americas, a generally rejected and abused people in the hemisphere. Nonetheless, in 
1816, Pétion’s constitutional revision eliminated this clause from the document.163 
Possibly because he found the language personally threatening as he and most of his 
advisors were mulattos.  
However, the revision felt short of purging the document entirely of ethnically-
based biases. Some of its most controversial segments include article 38 that outlawed 
any white from acquiring land, article 39, which states that only whites who had not 
joined the state before 1806 could enjoy the privileges of Haitian citizenship and finally 
article 44 states that any black, indigenous person or any who possesses such background 
no matter their place of birth shall be recognized as Haitian if he wished to relocate to 
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Haiti.164 Since 1805, Price-Mars explains, legislators believed that by stripping whites of 
the right to own property they would ensure the infinite extinction of slavery in the state. 
Although Santo Domingo possessed a strong white conservative population count, Boyer 
did not amend out these articles with its annexation in 1822. Boyer was unconcerned with 
winning the support of whites in the Eastern Part and thus felt little remorse when 
hundreds of white fled the island after his agrarian reform, which disproportionately 
violated the interests of this community. He chose to fill their void by sponsoring the 
relocation of six thousand freed blacks from Baltimore, New York, Philadelphia, and 
Boston to Hispaniola from 1824 to 1826.165 Boyer expected these city dwellers to settle 
in rural locations across the island166 to help exploit fertile abandoned lands. Upon 
arriving, these immigrants scattered to the cities and hundreds returned to the U.S. 
disappointed with the rural, culturally divergent and racially charged setting that they 
found in Haiti.167 In other words, the courting of American black migration made it clear 
that Boyer was not only disinterested in enticing the return of Dominican conservative 
whites but was uninterested in white immigration to the island in general. This attitude 
went against the common immigration preferences exercised by most of Haiti’s 
neighbors.   
The harassment of whites in Santo Domingo should not be simplified as immoral 
and racist. Boyer was a result of his time, a player who wanted his team (mulattos in 
Port-au-Prince) to win against the another competent opponent (whites conservatives in 
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Santo Domingo). He understood that cooperation was unfeasible because the contender 
could not be trusted. They were engaged in a zero sum game where only one could win. 
The presence of the other within the exclusive circle of influence allowed for the 
possibility that the losing side could return and displaced the previous winner with the 
passage of time. The de facto disadvantage that whites endured under the annexation to 
Haiti, Price-Mars sustains, may have provoked whites to self-identify as light skinned 
mulattos or mestizos in order to avoid legal persecution.168 Such a scenario would 
contrast heavily with present local and regional encouragement to whiten in order to 
attain effective suffrage and be more employable. This enticing hypothesis also merits 
further archival research. Particular attention should be given to property deeds and 
Catholic baptism records. Does the count of ethnically mixed people in the Catholic 
registry match the frequency with which these appeared within property records? 
 Nevertheless, the racial problem within Haiti was not specific to whites. There 
was also evident discrimination against blacks under Boyer. With the demise of 
Dessalines and Louverture, the separation between South and North was not just a 
political one but also encompassed a division based on ethnicity, Pétion and Boyer 
(mulattoes) against Christophe (black). Pétion and Boyer were members of the small but 
dominant mulatto community in Haiti, which kept the black masses often at a distance 
from all matters of influence. The chorus of disappointed voices concerning the racial 
issue in Haiti included the American Jonathan Brown. Brown wrote in 1837, “prejudice 
of color existing among the mulattoes in relation to their fellow citizens, the blacks, is 
almost as great as that once entertained by the whites of the colony against the class of 
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mulattoes.”169 The common conclusion was that mulattos generally wanted to keep 
blacks uneducated and in a state of abjection; a condition many like Brown considered a 
disappointing result of the Haitian Revolution. Felix Darfour (a immigrant from the 
Sudan) best paints the disadvantage of blacks. In August 1822, Darfour read a famous 
petition addressed to the Chamber of Deputies that vocalized his disgust with the racial 
bigotry against blacks and demanded political reform that made government more 
reliable and accessible.170 Boyer and his official newspaper Le Telegraphe deemed the 
manifestation seditious and ordered the arrest of senators, deputies, judges and other 
functionaries who had sponsored Darfour’s reading and ordered the execution of the 
petition’s reader.171 The degraded condition of blacks within Haiti invalidates the claim 
of Manuel Peña Battle that Dominicans were the only victims of racial exploitation under 
Boyer. In effect, only mulattos in the West enjoyed the full range of citizenship rights.  
 The only venue available for socio-economic mobility was military involvement. 
Mimi Sheller sustains that then “citizenship was defined by the elements of duty, 
obedience, and obligation (what the citizen owed the state), which far outweighed the 
rights-based elements of what the stated owed to its citizens.”172 The military was the 
only venue for social ascension. The influence of the military was such that it received 
the largest portion of public expenditures within Boyer’s budget and all communes were 
effectively administrated under the authority of the Commandant de Place and his 
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troops.173 This picture shows a clear union between the civil and military spheres. The 
comfortable condition of men in uniform reveals much about the state of key social 
services such as education and healthcare. According to James Franklin, Boyer had 
closed the various schools Christophe had erected in the North and recycled the space 
into “barracks for the military.”174 Under Boyer the military grew at the cost of education 
and other social services. This is best depicted after Boyer brought about the closure of 
the University of Santo Tomás de Aquino with the military draft of December 1823, 
which compelled all males from the age of 16 to 25 to join the armed forces.175 By 
cutting off its main consumer base, the oldest university in the Western Hemisphere was 
forced to close its doors permanently. The situation left the Church (who administered the 
institution) ruined for most of its avenues had now vanished. John Chandler observed on 
1842, that Port-au-Prince funded the existence of only two schools: an unsatisfactory 
public elementary school (with eighty two students on the roster) and a reputable lyceum 
(with a hundred and fifty students on the roster) both of which mainly served mulatto 
boys.176 The carelessness with regards to education may also indicate negligence in 
sanitation, infrastructure, and nutrition. Robert Lacerte expands on the issue of scarcity 
when he informs that people had limited access to flour, bread, salt, beef, pork, fish and 
lard.177 In effect, Boyer’s refusal to produce human investment, his failures with 
economic policies and the unsatisfactory results in foreign policy stimulated a slow but 
certain shrinkage of his base of support.  
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 The persecuted political dissenting voice in Haiti managed to coalesce and expand 
through effective use of the media and legislative elections. According to Mimi Sheller, 
the small community of educated youth within Port-au-Prince increasingly deemed 
Boyer’s republic as a farce, highlighting the evident problems with citizenship, race, 
political participation and social services.178 They publicized their dissatisfaction through 
establishing newspapers and running for office using the campaign platform of reform. 
Newspapers were the only venues of power that the youth had at their disposal since 
aging functionaries commanded over most civil and military leadership positions. 
L’Union and his editor Emile Nau vocalize the opposition within the capital.179 On the 
electoral campaign field, the two political forces behind Boyer’s slow but sure demise 
were Herárd Dumesle and David Saint-Preux, two young deputies who were illegally 
expelled from the Chamber in 1833 for fiercely pushing for reforms that Boyer 
disfavored.180 With such a measure Boyer was again making sure that the opposition was 
checked and silenced. However, the electorate challenged Boyer’s executive order when 
it reelected in 1837 and again in 1842 these same previously ejected representatives 
(from the communes of Cayes and Aquin respectively). 181  Furthermore, both election 
cycles ushered the liberal opposition to majority status within the Chamber of Deputes. 
Their victory was facilitated with the media’s sponsorship of the rising liberal wave. 
Particularly, an article in Le Manisfeste demanded for equality before the law, access to 
education, and commercial credit for workers.182  
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The stage was set for a clash between the relentless opposition of youth and the 
stubbornness of the Boyerian doctrine. Boyer refused to accept a consecutive electoral 
defeat and was adamant about further cooperation with the opposition. He tried to use the 
National Guard against the popular mulatto politicians seeking reform. Boyer, the 
“pacifist,” now rejected diplomacy and chose coercion. This stalemate produced the 
Revolution of Praslin, which brought the eventual demise of Jean Pierre Boyer in 1843 
after the military refused to carry out his orders.183 Boyer’s fatal blow had not come from 
white Dominicans, Catholics, blacks or the military, but rather from the sons of those 
closest to him. Furthermore, these subversive forces came from the South; the region 
which first brought him to power. In a sense, those who best vocalized their dissatisfied 
with the administration were those closest to Port-au-Prince, young insiders who had long 
enjoyed effective suffrage.  
In short, Boyer was a despot but he could govern. His early diplomatic 
predisposition propelled him to use his newfound leadership over the South to 
successfully invest and gamble for the control of an island that was long divided because 
of political greed. His patience and rhetorical allure were more effective weapons then 
Christophe’s arms and Núñez de Cáceres’ isolated political campaign. His deliberate 
focus on economics materialized in significant successes of which include: the 
emancipation of slaves in the Eastern Part, the birth of a rural peasantry with the 
execution of sweeping land reform, and the fortification of the tobacco and mahogany 
industry in the East. On the other hand, Boyer made substantial mistakes in his approach 
to domestic and international political disagreement. The ratification of the French 
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Ordinance of 1825 and the passage of the Rural Code were costly missteps in the 
President’s genuine effort to reanimate the Haitian economy. His overemphasis on 
economics was counterproductive in the long run. Other crucial matters such as education 
and ethnic bigotry he entirely disregarded in a misguided effort to ensure the survival of 
the established social order. Without Jean Pierre Boyer the unification of the island could 
not be achieved and with him it could not be maintained. His exile in 1843 followed an 
almost century-long period of Haitian political stability and economic decline. Boyer’s 
inability to install a republic that was dependable to all of its residents drove Dominicans 
and Haitians alike on separate journeys to determine the basis of their national identity, 
the purpose of their governments, their relationship to each other and to the conglomerate 
of nations. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE EAST’S SEPARATION FROM HAITI AND THE LIMITATION OF 
DOMINICAN NATIONALISM IN 1844 
 
 
The removal of Jean Pierre Boyer in 1843 ushered in substantial administrative 
reform to Haiti. This reexamination of the government’s structure prompted a review of 
state-sponsored racial prejudices. The review resulted in a power struggle between blacks 
and mulattos to determine who would be the new executive-in-chief. Similar to the 
political impasse that occurred in 1807 with the death of Dessalines, the exit of Boyer 
introduced a fierce dispute that threatened the indivisibility of the island. Although the 
intensity of the disagreement was most apparent in the Western side of the island, the 
quieter Eastern Part was the side vying to break with Port-au-Prince. Boyer had not 
delivered on his promises to integrate Dominicans as full-fledged Haitian citizens, his 
flaring authoritarian presence there was deemed degrading and his policies 
counterproductive. Consequently, Dominicans wanted separation from Haiti.  
However, the conservative (Afrancesados) and liberal (Trinitarios) parties could 
not agree on whether separation entailed sovereignty. The debate over Santo Domingo’s 
political future was further complicated with the manipulation from French diplomats, 
who sought to establish a French protectorate there. Contrary to popular understanding, 
the Afrancesados always had the upper hand in all political matters. Although the 
Trinitarios were working in a political and economic vacuum, they attempted to reverse 
their isolated condition through a substantive persuasive campaign that also hoped to 
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prompt Dominican nationalism among the masses. However, their ambitious pitch for 
independence did not elicit a majority backing in the 1840s. Therefore, the Dominican 
Republic was founded under the wing of a hesitant elite class and a weak nationalism. 
The birth of this republic in 1844 came about because the Afrancesados were unable to 
convince any given world power to establish a protectorate over the breakaway territory.  
After the demise of Jean-Pierre Boyer, the ruling class of Santo Domingo could 
only agree on single plan, separation from Haiti was necessary. On January 16, 1844 
approximately 150 of Santo Domingo’s most influential residents signed the “Act of 
Dominican Separation from the Haitian Republic.” According to the document, 
separation was necessary for a number of compelling reasons: Dominicans never 
received Haitian citizenship, right to privacy was disregarded, the condition of commerce 
and agriculture worsened, the rights to property were trampled with the law of 1824, the 
church was dispossessed, local Hispanic and Catholic traditions were not respected, 
Dominicans were forced to pay a debt184 they did not contract, and Riviere (Boyer’s 
successor) did not include Dominican representatives among his advisors.185 Based on the 
Act’s list of motifs, the traditional explanation that the separation came about because of 
religious and ethnic differences and because Port-au-Prince oppressed residents on the 
East (the reasons that Rodríguez Demorizi, Peña Battle and others embraced) is a 
misleading oversimplification of this matter. The primary criticism of the union was that 
Haiti failed to protect the economic interests of Dominican elites and the bourgeoisie; as 
a result, this segment was the most interested in separation. Unlike Santo Domingo’s first 
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declaration of independence in 1821 written by Núñez de Cáceres, this second attempt 
consisted of a more diverse backing including the voices of conservatives, liberals, the 
military, mulattos, whites, and priests. After providing the reasoning behind the 
separation, the document announced the creation of a democratic regime under the name, 
the Dominican Republic, which would ensure fundamental rights to education and 
property and secure freedom of speech, press and religion. 
The act, however, does not explain why the Republic merited the name 
“Dominican.” The term “Dominican” to classify the residents of the Eastern Part is 
employed in Núñez de Cáceres’ 1821 declaration of independence.186 Therefore, the birth 
of a Dominican identity did not result from Port-au-Prince’s twenty-two years 
governance over Santo Domingo. According to Esteban Deive, the term’s origin dates to 
sometime in the 1700s. Deive clarifies that the first written account that associates the 
term “Dominican” with the settlers of Hispaniola is in Luis Joséph Peguero’s work, 
Historia de la Conquista de la Isla Española de Santo Domingo Trasumptada en año de 
1762.187 However, this source does not expand beyond the association it makes. Many 
today speculate that the Dominican Catholic order inspired this noun. Further research is 
needed to explain why this specific term was coined and why it survived. Nevertheless, 
there is a clear embrace of “Dominicana” over other similar names such as Quisqueya,188 
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Santo Domingo, Spanish Haiti (this was the name that Núñez de Cáceres sponsored), and 
the Spanish Part (term Boyer embraced). The choice of the Act’s signers indicates a 
complete rejection of the Taino word (Haiti), which would hence be an exclusive referent 
to the Western portion. Boyer allowed locals in the East to uphold their divergent 
traditions and coalesce under the term “Dominican” through his use of discriminate legal 
coercion such as prohibiting the use of Spanish in official government matters. President 
Boyer was just not that invested in the “Haitianization” of the Eastern territories. By 
closing down schools and discouraging education, Boyer ensured the survival of a 
separate identity to the East. 
Another significant feature of the Act of 1844 was that it opted against using the 
word “independence,” which Núñez used in his pronouncement of 1821. The word is 
completely absent from the text. Victor Garrido agrees with Leónidas García Lluberes 
that the word “independence” is absent because the two words were interchangeable in 
1844 Santo Domingo.189 The argument has validity since although Núñez’s used the 
word “independence,” a protectorate with Gran Colombia rather than sovereignty was his 
main objective. Therefore, the “independence” he sought lacked autonomous substance. 
The probability that his successors would have a similar take on this word is probable 
since both generations belonged to a parallel educational background. Whether the 
exclusion of the word “independence” within the Act of 1844 was a conscious decision or 
not, it is clear that the endeavor for sovereignty was not one that Dominicans universally 
embraced. Haiti’s political structure had collapsed and the time was ripe for the 
disgruntled whites and conservative class in Santo Domingo to choose a different course. 
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The options were two: to create a sovereign republic or to mobilize and establish a 
protectorate under the wing of France, Spain or Great Britain. The influential ranchers 
and merchants of the Dominican south preferred France, which is why today they are 
classified as the Afrancesados (the French leaning). This was a group of economically 
and politically connected individuals, which included Buenaventura Báez, José 
Caminero, Tomás Bobadilla and Pedro Santana.190 They sustained that a new republic 
lacked the resources to protect itself from Haiti and from covetous imperialist forces. In 
addition, they feared that alone Santo Domingo would sustain indefinitely its economic 
depression.  
With these fears in mind the Afrancesados supported the Levasseur Plan. Nicolás 
Andrés Levasseur was the counsel general of France in Port-au-Prince during the 1840s; 
a manipulative diplomat who Jean Price-Mars claims was sabotaging Haiti with the 
introduction of fake paper money and by encouraging separatist movements in the 
Eastern Part with the promises of French military support.191 Buenaventura Báez met 
privately with Levasseur in the months prior to the drafting of the Act of 1844. Their 
meeting produced an accord known today as the Levasseur Plan, which planned to 
subordinate Santo Domingo under a French protectorate and stipulated for the secession 
of the peninsula of Samaná to France in perpetuity in order to incentivize Paris to accept 
the Plan.192 With this Plan the Afrancesados were returning Santo Domingo to its 
previous condition in the early 1800s, when Santo Domingo (then under French 
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administration) was used as a land bridge to recuperate the lost colony of Saint-
Domingue.  
Under the manipulation of French diplomats, the Afrancesados were positioning 
Santo Domingo to re-embark on the same path a preceding generation had rejected just 
thirty-five years prior. In order to give continuity to Dominican separatist inclinations, 
Levasseur arranged for the appointment of another French consulate on the island, this 
time locating it in the city of Santo Domingo under the administration of his associate, 
Eustache de Juchereau de Saint-Denys in 1843.193 The Plan was the exclusive 
undertaking of these two ambitious and scheming diplomats. Since the Levasseur Plan 
was not an initiative that Paris proposed, both Saint-Denis and Levasseur engaged in 
extensive persuasive dialogue with France’s Minister on Foreign Relations, Guizot.194 
The numerous letters195 among them give extensive reports on the unfolding situation in 
western and eastern Haiti, all intended to persuade France to accept Santo Domingo’s 
self-offering. Only the determination of Boyer for island unification in 1818 could match 
the ambition of these diplomats. It appears that Paris entertained the diplomat’s idea for 
months before reaching a final decision.  
In direct opposition to the Afrancesados was a group of urban bourgeois youth, 
who self-identified as the Trinitarios. This independent secret society was installed in 
July 16, 1838 under the presidency of Juan Pablo Duarte, the iconic figure Dominicans 
consider today as the founder of the republic.196 Few scholars explain why the formation 
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of the Trinitaria happened on this date rather than at an earlier or later time. José Gabriel 
García explains that Duarte had just then arrived to Santo Domingo from his studies in 
Europe and must have noticed that the departments in the East were undergoing a 
continuous and pronounced decayed under the governorship of General Carrie. There 
churches and buildings for public services were in ruins, streets were impassable with the 
unchecked growth of weeds and the unregulated transit of cattle that stopped to graze 
there, and the agriculture of coffee and cacao had turned into impenetrable forests.197 
Duarte’s incentive to start the Trinitaria may have resulted from a combination of his 
immersion in the revolutions of Europe and Latin América and his disapproval of seeing 
his countrymen adopt a passive attitude in the face of their lamentable condition.  
In an effort to built support among the masses, Duarte designed the Trinitaria to 
appeal to Catholics, to the young, and to those who enjoyed the arts. Doubts still exist 
concerning how the society got its name. One of its founding members, José María Serra 
explains that the name was chosen because there were nine founding members, who were 
subdivided into groups of three and thus constituting a trinity. Duarte’s sister, Rosa 
Duarte, challenges this explanation by asserting that the organizations’ founding 
members consisted of more then nine. It is possible that the reasoning behind the name 
was more religious than structural. The Trinitaria was an outlier within Santo Domingo; 
few locals espoused their agenda of forming an independent republic in the East. In 
addition to the merchant class of the central south, the Catholic Church also disapproved 
of the cause for independence. The Church’s disapproval of their mission was a 
significant hindrance to the realization of their mission. The Vicar General of the 
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Archdiocese of Santo Domingo, Tomás de Portes e Infante, championed the path of a 
French protectorate.198 Although there were some priests such as Gaspar Hernández who 
inclined in favor of a protectorate under Madrid, Portes chose France because Espartero’s 
regime in Madrid had adopted an anticlerical attitude, which the Holy See saw as 
conducive to the destruction of the Church there.199 The odds were against the Trinitarios 
for they lacked basic support from influential circles. As a means to increase their 
sponsorship, the society intertwined their political agenda to Catholicism. Christianity 
was a critical element of the organization, being present in their induction oath and their 
motto (Díos, Patria y Libertad), in the flag they designed and which Dominicans still 
raise today (with a dominant white cross separating the rectangles and at its center the 
coat of arms with a bible headed by a yellow cross), and christening the country they 
created as “Dominican” (alluding to a Catholic order). In other words, naming their 
organization as “the trinity” gave continuity to their Christian based agenda. The 
unquestionable Christian inspiration behind the Trinitaria may have been a strategy to 
invite Catholics to join the cause. 
The Trinitarios also used theater and drama as a medium to prompt patriotism 
among the masses of the capital. In Rosa Duarte’s notes she explains that in 1838 the 
organization created an auxiliary society named the “Filantrópica” or the Philanthropic. 
This society showcased classic theatrical dramas that that showed how the people “day 
by day understood their duties with their fatherland.”200 The Philanthropic produced 
dramas such as Vittorio Alfieri’s Bruto Primo: Roma Libre, Martínez de la Rosa’s La 
                                                 
198 Peréz, 613.  
199 Ibid. 
200 Apuntes de Rosa Duarte: Archivo y Versos de Juan Pablo Duarte, ed. Emilio 
Rodríguez Demorizi (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, C. por A, 1970), 47 
 83 
Viuda Padilla, and Eugenio Ochoa’s Un Día del Año 23 en Cádiz.201 As John Leslie 
explains, the use of Alfieri’s drama to advance a political agenda was simultaneously 
practiced in places like Montevideo, thousands of miles away from Santo Domingo.202 
This theatrical phenomenon emanated from Spain and was commonly showcased from 
1813 to 1830, the age of revolution.203 The selection of the plays is thus a direct result of 
Juan Pablo Duarte’s stay in the Iberian Peninsula. The Philanthropic did not only serve a 
purpose of acculturation or of stimulating patriotism, it was also a cover to the Trinitaria 
for its political vendetta against Port-au-Prince. Using theater rather than writing as 
means of mobilizing the masses was well guided tactic for illiteracy was rampant. Also 
the hidden message of the plays allowed viewers to engage in an activity that they would 
have rejected if it involved a more overt political propaganda. In accordance with 
Maríano Saviño, dramas also provided a means to survey the opinions of the masses 
concerning separation with Haiti and to help finance the purchase of ammunition (tickets 
cost eight pesos).204 It is not apparent, however, that the Philanthropic consisted of a 
traveling theater since the records indicate that it was only reserved to the Cárcel Vieja, 
“an imposing building situated next to the Palace of the Haitian governor.”205 Also, their 
plays might have only engaged a regular and nearby audience, thus limiting their reach to 
remain mostly cyclical and restricted rather than dispersive and expansive. In other 
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words, the extent of their persuasive campaign was reserved to the city of Santo 
Domingo.  
This proved to be a problem since the most fervent political opposition 
stemmed from people who were highly mobile, merchants. Merchants were constantly on 
the move trying to collect and sell merchandize across the provinces. Their agility 
allowed them to be well versed on various contemporary issues and to establish a far-
reaching network of supporters. Since Santo Domingo lacked fundamental mediums for 
information distribution such as newspapers (all of which were in the Western part and 
all of which were in French), merchants and other mobile individuals became the 
informants for the masses. The oral accounts these merchants provided were influenced 
by their political ideas, which often leaned on the conservative side. Therefore, the 
Trinitario’s goal to evolve Dominican identity into nationalism was running against a 
whole oral tradition of communication that went against their agenda. In other words, if 
the Trinitarios’ were to realize their mission they needed to branch beyond the capital 
city and bring their campaign to other municipalities. As evidenced in 1821, the influence 
of the municipalities could drown the conservative mandate from the city of Santo 
Domingo. However, the Trinitarios lacked the resources that Boyer as a head of state had 
in 1821 to deliver such a favorable change in attitude. In their defense, Duarte and his 
affiliates attempted unsuccessfully to obtain significant support abroad in places like 
Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and even in Port-au-Prince. 
Due to the friction existent between Afrancesados and Trinitarios, the Act of 
Dominican Separation had an element of impasse and thus lacked immediacy concerning 
post-separation projects. This impasse is revealed when we consider the question: if the 
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Act were signed in January why was the military declaration of separation delayed for 
more then a month? It appears that the document was not publicized immediately after it 
was ratified. Haitian authorities continued to administrate Santo Domingo in tranquility 
and ignored the existence of such document. A full frontal assault against Haitian 
authorities could not be carried out since more then half of the Act’s signers (the 
Afrancesados) were still waiting to hear from Paris on whether it had ratified the 
Levasseur Plan and whether it had approved the promised military aid to Santo Domingo. 
Without these reassurances from France much of the backing behind the document 
refused to enforce it or broadcast it until April 25. As a way to undermine the 
negotiations with France, the Trinitarios pushed forward the official proclamation of 
separation from Haiti to February 27.206 If the Afrancesados was the party that wanted to 
hold out, why did the Trinitarios wait a whole month to declare the separation? 
According to Moya Pons, the Trinitarios were fervently trying to persuade the powerful 
ranchers of El Seibo, Pedro and Ramón Santana, to support the cause for 
independence.207 An endorsement from Ramón Santana (the politically moderate of the 
brothers) was fundamental to the survival of the independence. In addition, the absence 
of the society’s leader, Juan Pablo Duarte, 208 may have stalled the proceedings even 
further. 
Now under the leadership of Francisco del Rosario Sánchez and Ramón Matías 
Mella, the Trinitarios would declare the formation of the Dominican Republic because 
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they were able to obtain key endorsements. On February 27, a handful of armed 
Trinitarios took hold of the La Puerta de la Misericordia and La Puerta del Conde, the 
entryway to the city of Santo Domingo.209 These insurgents were able to present a 
successful campaign against the Haitian defenses because they managed to convert 
Haiti’s main body of defense to their cause, the freed black and mulatto soldiers that 
composed Regiments 31 and 32.210 This major support was realized not simply because 
the Trinitarios’ reassurance that slavery would not be reinstituted within the new republic 
but also because the alternatives (a return to French or Spanish control) were detrimental 
to their overall ambitions within the military. It should also be noted that the insurgents 
were able to obtain the temporary support of politician and Afrancesado, Tomás 
Bobadilla.  
The Trinitarios were able to masterfully overcome their limitation, temporarily 
displace the majority voice (Afrancesados), paralyze the local Haitian regency, and 
produce their preferred outcome. Under the mediation of French Counsel Saint-Denys, 
the Trinitarios demanded the orderly evacuation of all Haitian functionaries from the 
Eastern Part within ten days.211 The insurgents had left Haitian authorities of Santo 
Domingo in such a defenseless condition that they resorted to the protection of the French 
diplomats. Their defenseless condition was not just the result of the desertion of 
Regiments 31 and 32, but also because the Eastern Part had never attained a strong 
French Creole-speaking presence. In other words, because Haitian authorities did not 
encourage the free movement of its citizens across the island, they stood alone in Santo 
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Domingo and unable to recruit possible supporters. The Spanish Part was a backwater 
within Haiti, a place barren of opportunities that could not stimulate Creole-speaking 
Haitians to relocate there. Also the poor condition of the infrastructure and the 
uncertainty of the Haitian political apparatus made it difficult to quickly summon and 
relocate Port-au-Prince’s military to Santo Domingo to ensure island-wide unity. As 
agreed upon, Haitian functionaries handed the city over to a Governmental Junta on 
February 29, then left by boat on March 8, while other Haitian civilians were required to 
leave within a months.212 Due to the eminent threat of war, the Afrancesados had to 
accept the premature realization of Santo Domingo’s separation.Haiti had refused to grant 
Dominicans the independence they sought, for Haitian leaders believed that Dominicans 
lacked the tools and the will to institute a sovereign state. Port-au-Prince was aware of the 
Afrancesados’ inclination to return Santo Domingo to French control, a project that it 
wanted to prevent at all costs. Haitians had invested extensively since the early 1800s to 
ensure the end of European dominance on the island. This threat was reassured with the 
incorporation of Afrancesados within the newly instituted governing Junta in the East.213  
However, Haitian authorities were unable to challenge Dominican ambitions since 
their military competence had diminished with the exit of Boyer. President Rivière 
Hérard responded to the separation by sending thirty thousand armed men to recapture 
the territory on March 15, 1844. The forces planned to pacify the Eastern Part with the 
reapportionment of forces into three wings: the one heading southeast headed by Herárd, 
the second descending from the north lead by General Pierrot and the third approaching 
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from the center led by General Souffrant.214 This was the first invasion of Haitian forces 
since 1805 into the Eastern territory and the second overall. By March 18, Herárd’s 
forces were able to take hold of the municipalities of San Juan de la Maguana and Las 
Matas fairly easily.215 The Haitians vastly outnumbered (even more so after the first and 
third wings combined in battle at Azua) the Dominican soldiers, which did not surpass 
the ten thousand. The victory in the Southwest would be the only major triumph for the 
Haitian side, however. The troops never reached Santo Domingo because local defenses 
in Santiago and Azua impeded their progress southeast. According to José María Imbert’s 
(the General defending Santiago) report of April 5, 1844 to Santo Domingo, “in Santiago, 
the enemy did not leave behind in the battlefield less then six hundred dead and…the 
number of wounded was very superior…[while on] our part we suffered not one casualty 
or a wounded.”216 The disproportionate loss of Haitian lives against Dominicans leaves 
historians to this day dumbfounded. It is specially perplexing considering that this was 
the army that a generation earlier had defeated the imposing force sent from France, 
Great Britain and Spain and that in 1844 a small and immature guerrilla combats were 
quickly overpowering.  
Boyer’s mistakes and his exit crippled Haitian defenses rendering it ineffective in 
defending the unity he had established. A reason behind the unsatisfactory performance 
of Haitian troops was that they did not understand the importance of the cause for which 
they were fighting. Santo Domingo was a distant, peripheral place, where most soldiers 
did not sustain any connection and thus they deemed as alien. Boyer and his successors 
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kept Santo Domingo underdeveloped and disconnected. When the Eastern Part became 
restless, those to the West were indifferent to it. Therefore, the Haitian-Dominican War 
was an unpopular affair in the West.217 Did soldiers determined to spill their blood in 
order to prevent the loss of Santo Domingo? Did they consider President Herárd as their 
legitimate commander-in-chief? Many within the Haitian military wanted to eject Herárd 
from office. As Price-Mars explains soldiers were suffering from conflicting political 
ideologies that distracted them from solely concentrating on the mission at hand, securing 
the East.  
In addition to the glaring political discrepancy, the morale of the troops descended 
further due to the deplorable conditions they were fighting under. Soldiers were being 
asked to walk barefoot and with minimal food supply a distance of 330 kilometers and 
the replenishment of ammunition was not guaranteed. The combination of all these 
unfavorable elements produced significant troop desertion in Herárd’s wing while in 
Azua.218 Furthermore, the lack of communication between the wings descending from the 
North and the South increased uncertainty and decreased optimism among the Haitian 
troops. This lack of interaction allowed the North wing to accept false rumors of 
President Herárd’s death during the battle in Azua. This rumor stimulated Pierrot to sign 
a peace treaty with General Imbert on March 30 in Santiago and soon after brought him 
to promptly return to Haiti.219 As evidenced by Imbert’s letters to the Junta in Santo 
Domingo, communication among the Dominican front was effective giving them yet 
another advantage besides motivation, access to food, etc. Although President Herárd did 
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not die in Azua, his political career would expire while fighting there. The liberal forces 
that President Herárd had solicited to overthrow Jean Pierre Boyer would call for his 
removal after he closed the Haitian National Assembly in 1844.220 The altercation that 
ensued in the West forced Herárd to suspend the assault on Azua by April. The Piquet 
Rebellion forced Herárd into exile in Jamaica and cleared the way for Phillippe Guerrier 
to quickly replace him.221 Henceforth Haiti would not see the type of stability that Boyer 
commanded, as presidents would come and go without following legal succession 
procedure. Nonetheless, Haitians armies would repeatedly threaten Dominican 
independence until 1856 when Port-au-Prince finally recognized its sovereignty on the 
East.  
Although Dominicans had managed to hold off the assault from the West, the 
political disagreement between Afrancesados and Trinitarios did not dissolve with the 
victory at Azua and Santiago. The invasion of Herárd’s army had temporarily united 
Dominicans in order to expel their common adversary. As a means to produce a stronger 
defensive front against Herárd’s invading army, Sánchez and the Trinitarios forfeited 
leadership of the Junta in early March to Bobadilla and other conservatives. Once Herárd 
was no longer a problem, the existent conflict of interests between these two factions 
would reemerge and cause a power struggle. The proactivity of the Trinitarios on 
February 27 brought them island-wide fame, a status that positioned them as influential 
individuals possessing credibility and bargaining leverage. Duarte, Pérez y Piña, and 
other exiles Trinitarios returned to the liberated Dominican territory on March 15. Soon 
upon their return Duarte and his affiliates commenced an island-wide march to multiply 
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their popular support. The mission sought to overwhelm conservative projects that 
intended to replace the republic with a protectorate.222 On June 9, the Trinitarios and 
Coronel Gabino Puello led a successful governmental take back, which involved the 
removal of Bobadilla and his affiliates from the Junta.223 Duarte quickly was called the 
“patriarch of the fatherland” and gained the rank of General. Such early titles testify to 
his persuasive appeal and his increasing influence within the early military. Duarte also 
collaborated with the recent war hero, General José María Imbert. Their collaboration and 
Duarte’s march into the Cibao delivered the Trinitarios unquestionable popularity within 
the main cities of the region, Santiago and La Vega.  
Duarte’s march across the Cibao was important but inopportune. Pedro Santana, 
the General who defeated Herárd at Azua, refused to be compliant with the increasingly 
influential Trinitarios. He penetrated Santo Domingo with more then two thousand 
soldiers, demanded the title of commander-in-chief and the dissolution of the liberal 
Junta.224 A massive entourage ushered Duarte to the North, effectively draining the 
capital of his affiliates and guaranteeing Santana a quick takeover of the city. Santana’s 
counter-revolutionary move reignited the classic conflict between the Central-south and 
the Cibao. On July 19, Santiago and other municipalities of the Cibao declared Duarte 
“president of the Dominican Republic, with the condition that he salve the country from 
foreign domination and that he may convoke the constituency and remedy the crisis of 
the Public Treasury.”225 The now pro-Trinitario Cibao threatened to secede the infant 
republic without Duarte. The Afrancesados in the capital chose to silence the Cibao’s 
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request and demanded for the blood of the Trinitarios. The capital’s despotism increased 
the potential for a civil war and the self-destructive of the republic.226 The Trinitarios 
understood the importance of the Cibao, a region that in 1822 had silenced the capital and 
granted Boyer the Eastern territory. However, the liberals underestimated Santana’s 
ambition and his swiftness. The removal of Bobadilla and Báez was a significant step, but 
the real military force behind the conservatives lay in Santana. Therefore, the liberals 
should have checked Santana’s forces before leaving the capital city. This mistake would 
cost them the political and military leadership they had just attained.  
Why did Santana’s counter-revolution wait an entire month after the Trinitario’s 
revolution of June? Was Santana waiting for the Trinitarios to vacate the capital city? Or 
was this delay the result of hesitation on behalf of the General to counter attack and if so 
who convinced him to do so? The degree of manipulation that Saint-Denys exerted over 
Santana is glaring. Acting as the controllers of the conservative chess pieces, Saint-Denys 
reports, “I have obligated Santana to refuse the dictatorship…and to conserve the Junta… 
eliminating the members introduced with the coup d’état of June 9 and arranging for the 
return of those arbitrarily expelled.”227 Saint-Denys’s letter implies that Santana answers 
to him. His advise to Santana was very practical. According to the diplomat, if Santana 
declared himself dictator rather than president of the Junta, this declaration would 
alienate the Cibao and usher in a civil war. What is less clear is what was the response of 
the Trinitarios. Gabriel García sustains that Duarte capitulated in favor of Santana in 
order to impede the evolution of war.228 Neither the notes of Rosa Duarte nor the writings 
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of the Trinitario, José María Sierra, expand on this specific account. The reason as to 
why the Trinitarios fell so easily when they enjoyed the full backing of the Cibao is 
another area that merits further study.  
This black and white imagery, where Duarte is self-sacrificing and Santana and 
Saint-Denys are despotic is troublesome and over simplistic. Since the regime of Rafael 
L. Trujillo, the Trinitarios are increasingly lauded as heroes while their opponents are 
deemed as obstructionist extremists. If this depiction were accurate, Santana would have 
never enjoyed such support from a people that understood well and rejected dictatorial 
policy. On July 12, 1844, the United States chose to paint Santana in a more favorable 
light describing the General as possessing much courage, “prudence and modesty,” of 
being “laborious,” generous and that he genuinely “desires the best for his country.”229 
His actions are not that different from those that Boyer took in 1822 or the Trinitarios in 
June 1844; all of these parties opted to persecute and remove the opposition from 
political participation. Such intolerance is more reflective of a society that is 
unacquainted with the democracy they wished to establish and less an indication of vile 
individuals. Although Santana persecuted the Trinitarios, he did not call for their 
assassination. In accordance with Saint-Denys, Santana pushed for the political ostracism 
and the expulsion from the republic of all the Trinitarios and their families in September 
1844. Due to his pronounced manipulative style, Saint-Denys is someone who merits also 
a more detailed study. He was no ordinary diplomat. Saint-Denys had managed to 
convince educated mature men that they were defenseless against this same enemy they 
had just defeated. Moreover, he had had degraded a victorious and united community to 
                                                 
229 Garrido, 132. 
 94 
turn against itself in spectacular fashion and managed to remediate the eminent war, 
which his manipulation may have produced. The diplomatic manipulative quality of Saint 
Denys runs parallel to that of Boyer. 
But even with all of Saint-Denys’ manipulative skills, however, his letters failed 
to convince the French Crown. On March 19 and again on July 20, Foreign Minister 
Guizot writes Saint-Denys and Levasseur, “it is not convenient for France to again take 
hold of that island.”230 According to Guizot, Paris refused to pacify an island that 
continued to be the theater of obvious and continuous “interior dissentions.” He 
reaffirmed France’s respect for Haitian sovereignty, promised recognition of Dominican 
autonomy and encouraged all other world powers to do the same.231  However, there is 
more behind Guizot’s abstinent and diplomatic demeanor. French policy on foreign 
affairs was one that involved a standstill concerning direct intervention in Latin American 
affairs. Favorable commerce between France, Great Britain, Spain, and the United States 
had forged a collaborative association among these states. French intervention within 
Santo Domingo would have given France an irregular advantage over the others and 
negatively affected their intertwined commercial flows.232 Unlike conservatives in Santo 
Domingo who had forgotten the toll the French domination had exerted over the colony, 
Paris recognized and rejected the cost that such a restoration entailed. Ultimately, both 
the British and the French reaffirmed that only Spain had the right to intervene in Santo 
Domingo, offer that the Spanish again discarded. 
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Therefore, it was mainly because of imperialistic restraint that the Dominican 
Republic became an independent state in 1844. The autonomous liberal movement had 
failed against the conservative protectionist consensus, positioning the republic to be 
merely a temporary condition. The republic was officially on the path to termination on 
June 1, 1844 after the governmental Junta ratified the “Reiteration of the Petition for the 
Recognition and Protection of France.” Although Duarte and Sánchez retracted their 
signatures from this document with the coup they sponsored that month, the counter-
revolution of Santana put a definite silence to the independent struggle. It was mainly 
because Paris and Madrid decline to accept this political tutelage that the republic was 
born in 1844 and persisted beyond that year. Therefore, Joaquín Balaguer was 
misinformed when he stated that Santo Domingo was highly “coveted by all the 
colonizing powers of the 18th and 19th century.”233 To the contrary, the list of states that 
rejected Santo Domingo’s self-offering is lengthy: Gran Colombia in 1821, Spain in 1830 
and 1844, and France and Great Britain in 1844.  
Dominicans would be forced to remain a nation-state because they refused to be 
part of Haiti and because they were rejected by all others imperialist forces. This 
hesitation within the ruling elite to establish a nation-state also impeded the promotion of 
Dominican nationalism. The feeble nationalism engendered in 1844 was one of the main 
reasons why the republic expired in 1861 with its annexation to Spain. The annexation 
was a direct breach of the noninterventionist restrictions that the Monroe Doctrine of 
1823. This Doctrine was a U.S. foreign policy that discouraged the European powers 
from renewing their colonialist presence in the Americas. It happened simultaneously as 
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France intervened in Mexico.234 The Spanish annexation of Santo Domingo and the 
French intervention in Mexico attest to the limited enforceability of the Monroe Doctrine 
at a time when the United States was caving into civil war. Nonetheless, Santo Domingo 
became a persistent thorn in Spain’s side, whose prolonged indecision concerning 
autonomy enticed separatist’s discussions in Cuba and Puerto Rico.  
The Dominican Republic was the idea of a group of bourgeois young men called 
the Trinitarios who lacked political influence but who possessed tremendous ambition. 
Their motivation stemmed from the liberal campaign that dominated public discussion 
both in Europe and on the American mainland. As detailed under the Act of Dominican 
Separation, the desire for separation from Haiti was based on the disapproval over Port-
au-Prince’s approach to citizenship, its execution of economic policy, its attacks against 
Hispanic and Catholic traditions, and the lack of Dominican representation within 
President Herárd’s administration. Although the Act had a tone of immediacy, it was not 
written for instantaneous broadcast. Its conservative signers, the Afrancesados, proved a 
consistent hindrance against the independence that the Trinitarios pronounced in 
February 27, 1844. Two intrusive diplomatic agents from France who sought to reinstall 
Hispaniola as a French satellite encouraged conservative unease with Dominican 
sovereignty. Although both divergent parties came together to defeat the vast but 
disjointed Haitian army in March, their unity was short lived.  
The diplomats’ manipulation accentuated the differences between liberal and 
conservatives, hampered their potential cooperation and threatened to splinter the new 
republic. The severity of the division was made clear in July, when the Cibao refused to 
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acknowledge the legitimacy of governmental Junta that Pedro Santana and his 
Afrancesados presided over. Although the Trinitarios were a formidable obstacle to the 
Levasseur plan, the main impediment to the protectorate came from Paris itself and other 
competing world capitals. The world powers jointly refused to accept the self-offer of 
Santo Domingo, forcing the victorious conservative party to hesitantly preserve for 
seventeen years the sovereignty their competitors had realized. The ruling Dominican 
class could not see beyond their present condition in 1844 and therefore would set the 
society they headed on a cyclical historical course that repeated the mistakes of the recent 
past and slowed the development of the infant nation-state. These conditions of feeble 
nationalism would ultimately bring Dominicans to willingly return to the tutelage of 
Spain in 1861. The independence of 1844 was, therefore, tentative and inconclusive.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The relationship between Dominicans and Haitians is one of coexistence. Both of 
these nations have been intricately tied together through commercial interaction and 
cultural osmosis. The notion that each of their respective nationalities is contradictory to 
one another is simply ungrounded. It was because of commonalities with an Afro-
Caribbean past and because of their mutual history with colonial exploitation that the two 
entities united politically for the first and last time in 1822. The coalescing of both 
communities under the Haitian flag was not achieved through Port-au-Prince’s 
employment of force as is commonly upheld by domestic and international scholars alike 
(except for Haitian historians). The annexation of the Eastern Part was obtained with the 
successful persuasive campaign of Jean Pierre Boyer. Although Boyer was not the first 
Haitian president to desire such a union, he was the first to do it through strictly legal 
means as evidenced by the pronouncements of the Eastern municipalities. Therefore, the 
best term to describe Santo Domingo’s incorporation to Haiti is a union or an annexation. 
The municipalities’ summons for Haitian annexation showcased a fundamental division 
within Dominican society that still exists today: the rivalry between the Cibao and the 
capital city. Today these rivalries still play out in baseball and political elections. 
Consequently, the overemphasis on the duality between Haitians and Dominicans 
overlooks pertinent divisions within Dominicans themselves.  
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Nonetheless, Spain’s reaction to regaining (in 1809) and losing (in 1821) Santo 
Domingo was that of resounding indifference. There are two explanations for Madrid’s 
apathy: Madrid was politically unfit to hold onto its colony and Santo Domingo was not 
worth the cost that entailed the maintenance of its colonial status. Santo Domingo was 
underdeveloped, under-populated and highly unattractive for foreign investment after 
being a battleground for the altercations among the French, black slaves, British and the 
Spanish. Any ties of affection for its first colonial settlement in the Americas were lost 
with the Peace of Basel on 1795. The Archdiocese of Santo Domingo and Dominican 
immigrants abroad tried fervently to reanimate Madrid’s interest in Hispaniola, efforts 
that are apparent with the diplomatic conference of 1830, led by Fernández de Castro.  
Spain’s multiple rejections of Santo Domingo may explain why Dominicans do 
not define their nationality in contrast to Spain but rather continuously reference it. 
Madrid’s rejection also ensued a longing for colonial patronage within the city of Santo 
Domingo that is evident in 1808 with the war for colonial restoration, with the campaign 
of 1830 (led by Fernández de Castro) and in 1861 with the annexation to Spain. In 
contrast, to Dominicans’ contemporary evocation to their Spanish heritage, a negative 
reference is often evident when referencing their past with Haiti. Congruently, local 
classification of the Dominican union to Haiti and Spain involves contrasting sentiments: 
the union with Haiti is deemed an “occupation” while the union with Spain in 1809 and 
1861 merit softer terms such as “restoration” and “annexation.” The divergence in 
terminology is significant since both partnerships resulted from internal request and were 
ultimately deemed unbeneficial to the consensus of elites in Santo Domingo. 
Nonetheless, the current coinage of these terms reflects an anti-Haitian bias not 
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representative of the independence movement of 1844. The Act of separation of 1844 is 
void of any ethnic based prejudice against Haitians.  
Boyer’s administration concentrated much of its political agenda on the economic 
development of the island. Four major undertakings defined his economic policies: the 
abolition of slavery in the East of 1822, the land and property reform law of 1823, the 
French Ordinance of 1825 and the Rural Code of 1826. With the exception of the first, 
these measures failed because they were devised without taking into consideration local 
inclinations. Moreover, the failure of these policies was eminent because they were 
conducive to ethnic conflict. Nonetheless, Boyer’s administration did have favorable 
effects on the island overall. Boyer was the first to realize the indivisibility clause of the 
Haitian constitution through legal means. He managed to instill a local peasantry through 
slave emancipation and land reform, stimulated the tobacco and mahogany industries of 
the Cibao, and gave Haiti its longest period of political stability in the 19th century. 
Boyer’s campaign to keep the masses uneducated, to maintain the legislature closed to 
divergent voices, and his refrain from bridging the distinct identities within Haiti 
(through improved infrastructure and literacy) not only brought about his removal from 
office but also unraveled the superficial political confederacy he had installed. Moreover, 
Boyer dismissed key local issues in order to attend to international policy that could 
deliver Haiti diplomatic recognition. 
The lack of island cohesion permitted the preservation of contrasting identities 
(blacks v. mulattos, urban v. rural, Cibao v. city of Santo Domingo, etc). The severity of 
their disassociation stimulated the Eastern Part to seek separation in 1844. Although a 
Dominican identity existed long before Boyer’s rise to power, it was the unity under Haiti 
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that brought easterners to embrace this self-identification. However, the presence of a 
“Dominican” identity was insufficient to usher independence to this breakaway territory. 
French diplomats sponsored local insecurities concerning economics and military 
readiness. In turn, these insecurities discouraged the transformation of said identity into a 
national consensus. Their campaign resonated most among conservative elites, who 
rejected sovereignty and instead opted to return Santo Domingo under French control. In 
opposition to this plan, a society of urban bourgeois youth, the Trinitaria, would 
champion the project of independence. Against the dominant conservative consensus, the 
Trinitarios delivered Dominicans sovereignty on February 27, 1844.  
However, according to Pedro Troncoso Sánchez, the Dominican awakening of 
1844 was indecisive. 235 The Trinitarios failed to convince sufficient people of local 
capability to ensure Dominican self-defense and economic growth. Therefore, national 
consensus they were trying to install in Santo Domingo matured late. This was because 
the ruling class saw the republic as a temporary condition that should be abandoned at the 
first indication that a greater power was willing to take on its tutelage. The Trinitarios 
had forced-fed independence to the elite, an option that they had always plainly rejected. 
This rejection manifested itself just nine days after the Trinitarios declared independence 
at the Puerta del Conde. In 1844, the Junta in Santo Domingo produced two official 
“solicitations” that confirmed to Paris their willingness to submit to their regency. The 
first was named “Solicitud de Protección Francesa a Cambio de a Cesión de la Península 
de Samaná” ratified on March 8 and the second was titled “Reiteración de la Solicitud de 
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Reconocimiento y Protección de Francia” ratified on June 1st.236 The Junta and much of 
the ruling class agreed that separation from Port-au-Prince was eminent. Therefore, the 
separation of the Eastern Part from Haiti would have happened with or without the 
Trinitarios.  
Although the Trinitarios were the orchestrating force behind the declaration of 
independence in 1844, it was Paris’s rejection of the Levasseur Plan and the hesitation of 
other world powers that delivered Dominicans a premature independence. If Minister 
Guizot had agreed to succumb to Levasseur’s and Saint-Denys’s plan, the maneuverings 
of the Trinitarios would have been quickly discarded for they were the minority party 
within the local political circle. Juan Pablo Duarte and his affiliates came too early or 
were not given enough time to definitively awaken Dominican nationalism. Also they 
came short of installing a government with republican qualities. The republic of 1844 was 
not all that different from their neighbors to the West. In other words, Santana installed 
an authoritarian regime much like that found in Haiti, probably as autocratic as that of 
Boyer. The weakness of Dominican nationalism throughout the early and mid 1800s 
brought Santo Domingo to produce three separate declarations of separation: 1821, 1844, 
and 1863. In contrast to Haitians whose drive towards independence was tied to the need 
for freedom, the Dominican drive to separation was tied to communal protection and 
citizenship, demands that in the case of the later were not exclusively realized with the 
establishment of an independent nation. The main concern of the elite was security and 
prosperity, which they did not see as tied to sovereignty.  
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Furthermore, in contrast to Troncoso’s argument, the restoration of the Dominican 
Republic in 1865 was also indecisive. The ruling class was still uninterested in the 
continuation of the republic. By January 1868, Dominican President Buenaventura Baéz 
(the main Dominican architect behind the Levasseur Plan) was negotiating the cession of 
Samaná and other Dominican territory to the United States.237 The partial cession of 
Samaná to the U.S. was expanded later that year to include the Dominican territory as a 
whole, when both President Báez and Andrew Johnson agreed to the annexation. The 
treaty of annexation would again be presented the following year with the reassurance 
and blessing of President Ulysses Grant. Both times the measure was killed at the 
Congressional level. The Dominican Republic would have ceased to exist on 1869 if just 
one Senator had voted for its annexation, Charles Sumner, the Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee.238 Therefore, 1844, 1861, 1868, and 1869, were years when the 
local ruling coalition had defaulted against saving the republic. The political influence of 
Afrancesados, like Santana and Báez, left Dominican nationalism for decades on 
crutches. It would not be until their definitive exit in the 1870s that the republic that 
Duarte, Sánchez and Mella founded would have the opportunity to persist unimpaired. 
The feeble nature of Dominican nationalism was the result of a hesitant 
conservative elite from the city of Santo Domingo. The spirit of nationalism was 
strongest in the Cibao and the Southwest and weakest in the capital city. This contrast is 
confirmed with the Cibao’s early support for the cause of the Trinitarios and their prompt 
rejection of the annexation to Spain. Dominican historians do not admit to the tardy 
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nationalist awakening of the city of Santo Domingo and the duality that existed between 
it and the surrounding municipalities. To overlook this important dichotomy is to 
misunderstand the birth and evolution of the Dominican Republic. The narrative is not 
yet complete. One of the many glaring gaps is why did the Trinitarios disappear in July 
1844 if they enjoyed the full backing of the municipalities and the support of much of the 
military community. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has stated, there are always silences 
within the historical narrative because the plethora of voices lack equal access and 
influence over archives.239 Let us not stop asking questions, for the portrait of the past is 
never completely faithful to the subject it tries to recollect.  
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